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“Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest sense of that word.
Reproduction, of course, is merely one of the incidents of growth. And
what is growth? Not mere increase. Spencer says it is the passage from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous—or, if we prefer English to
Spencerese—diversification.”**
“The fact is that complexity is self-potentiating. Complex systems generally engender further principles of order that produce yet greater
complexities. Complex organisms create an impetus towards complex
societies, complex machines towards complex industries, complex armaments towards complex armies. And the world’s complexity means
there is, now and always, more to reality than our science – or for that
matter our speculation and our philosophy—is able to dream of.”***

INTRODUCTION

M

odern international law seems to be in disarray. The classic doctrines of international law, with their focus on sovereignty, state
consent, custom, and treaty, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for
many of the practices and institutional structures that fill the global legal
universe. The contemporary legal terrain seems to be characterized by
overlapping jurisdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations, and
competing worldviews. But what are the social implications of the deepening fragmentation and increasing complexity of the global legal system? Some observers argue that these phenomena constitute a new global
risk, which requires urgent collective response. Global constitutionalization is put forward in this context as a possible and appropriate reaction.1

** 1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
§1.174 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds.) (1931).
*** NICHOLAS RESCHER, NATURE AND UNDERSTANDING: THE METAPHYSICS AND
METHOD OF SCIENCE 25 (Clarendon Press) (2000).
1. This was the approach of two former Presidents of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume. Both expressed
their concern regarding the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the increasing fragmentation of the international legal order and suggested extending and reaffirming the powers and international status of the ICJ as a solution. See Judge Stephen M.
Schwebel, President, ICJ, Address to the Plenary Session of the United Nations (Oct. 26,
1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=133&pt=1&p1=6
&p2=1 [hereinafter Schwebel Speech 1999]; Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, ICJ,
Address to the to the United Nations General Assembly, (Oct. 26 2000), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/9/3069.pdf [hereinafter Guillaume Speech 2000].
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Using the notions of purity and paradox, this Article develops an analytic framework by which the increasing complexity of the international
legal system can be elucidated. Drawing on this framework, the Article
considers the consequences of the complexification of the global legal
system in terms of its stability and legitimacy. Rather than seeing the
messy and complex nature of modern international law as a risk, this Article depicts it as an evolutionary achievement that extends the horizon of
possibilities through which the international legal system can react to
social pressures. In this light, attempts to purify the international legal
system by appealing to grand theories⎯constitutional, moral, or
other⎯are ill-conceived for two reasons: first, because these grand theories fail to recognize the innate paradoxicality of the law; and second,
because such theories constitute a threat to the legitimacy and resilience
of the global legal system. This Article explores, in this context, alternative institutional models that draw upon⎯rather than oppose⎯the complexity and paradoxicality of modern international law.
This Article opens with Section I, a discussion of the Westphalian
scheme of validity (what I will call “the purity thesis”). It then considers,
in Section II, the invocation of the Westphalian scheme within new international regimes such as the World Trade Organization and the International Criminal Court and argues that the Westphalian scheme creates
irresolvable paradoxes within these regimes. To facilitate this argument,
this Article develops a model of paradoxicality in philosophy and law.
Section III explores alternative forms of validation that claim to fill the
normative void caused by the demise of the Westphalian model. On close
inspection, these alternative forms of validation prove equally problematic, lacking both coherence and completeness. Section IV takes a step
back by looking into the history of international legal theory for the
foundations of the Westphalian scheme of validity. This historical examination demonstrates that international law has never been pure. I
show that this impurity closely parallels the problem of grounding in philosophy, especially as reflected in the semantic paradox entitled “the
Truth-Teller Paradox.” The last part of this section explores the role of
paradoxes in the dynamic of autonomous and self-organizing systems
(such as law). Given the impurity of international law historically, what
then is unique about the current state of international law? This question
is addressed in Section V, which argues that what is unique about the
current system of international law is not the impurity of our forms of
validation, but the proliferation of multiple, paradoxical validating techniques that are invoked simultaneously at the forefront of the international legal body. The contemporary universe of transnational law is
characterized by a shift from (imaginary) purity to multiple paradoxical-
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ity—a process of polymorphosis. What are the practical consequences of
this process? The remainder of this Article explores the sociological implications of this process, drawing on ideas from systems theory and
ecology. It concludes, in Section IV, with a discussion of the false promise of global constitutionalism, setting it against an alternative institutional model: non-hierarchical reflexivity.
I. PURITY: THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE
The pure conception of international law aspired to provide a complete
and coherent account of the structure of international law. In particular, it
argued that international law regulates⎯in a complete and coherent fashion⎯the creation of new (international) norms.2 A succinct description
of the Westphalian narrative can be found in an article published by Leo
Gross in 1948:
The Peace of Westphalia . . . marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the
old into the new world. . . . In the political field it marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option
for a new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of
states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free
from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or organization above the sovereign states is no longer. . . . This new system
rests on international law and the balance of power, a law operating between rather than above states and a power operating between rather
than above states.3

In the legal domain, the Westphalian narrative was translated into an
articulated doctrine of validity and authority. This doctrine⎯in the form
explicated here⎯constitutes what I call the pure vision of international
law.4 One of the most eloquent advocates of the purity thesis was Josef
2. For a historical account of the development of the theory of international law, see
generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 353–509 (Cambridge University Press 2002);
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291
(2006).
3. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 28–29
(1948). The Westphalian narrative was discussed in numerous articles and books. See,
e.g., Amos S. Hershey, History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia, 6
AM. J. INT’L L. 30 (1912); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and
the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 (2001) (citations omitted).
4. This vision can be associated, of course, with the positivist school, whose most
obvious representative in the early twentieth century was Hans Kelsen. See Martti
Koskenniemi, Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 215, 216–217 (1997); Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of Inter-
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Kunz. Kunz argued that international law regulates the creation of international norms through two hierarchically ordered procedures: custom
and treaty.5 Both are based on the notion of state consent. Custom, Kunz
argued, is the hierarchically higher form of norm creation in international
law. “Custom-produced, general international law is the basis; the customary principle of ‘Pacta sunt servanda’ is the reason for the validity of
all particular international law created by the treaty procedure.”6 International law also lays down the conditions under which the procedure of
custom creates valid norms of general international law. These two conditions are usage and opinio juris.7 Jus cogens norms, to the extent that
they have not been codified in treaties, constitute another type of customary law.8 This legal articulation of the Westphalian narrative seeks to
provide a complete and coherent account of the way in which international law regulates the creation of new norms. This account, although
without explicit hierarchical order, also underlies Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states that international
disputes should be resolved primarily through the application of international conventions and international custom.9

national Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 523, 548 (2004).
5. Joseph L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L.
662, 665 (1953) (“Treaty and custom are two different, independent procedures for creating international legal norms.”).
6. Id. The status of the norm pacta sunt servanda as a norm of general international
law is probably beyond doubt. Kunz argues that it constitutes “the axiom, postulate and
categorical imperative of the science of international law” and is “undoubtedly a positive
norm of general international law.” Joseph L. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the
Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 180, 180 (1945). Its status received further
recognition in the text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (the definitions of “ratification,” “acceptance,” “approval,” and “accession” all emphasize state consent). See also Paul Schiff Berman, From International
Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 487 (2005).
7. Kunz, supra note 5, at 665. On the interpretation of these two conditions, see
Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 548.
8. See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party
States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 57 (2001) (with respect to the prohibitions
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
9. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S 993. It is also echoed in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which states
that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law,” thus reflecting the hierarchical order postulated by Kunz.
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art 53. Kunz, supra note 5, at 665.
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II. PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT INVOCATIONS
OF THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE
In describing the demise of the Westphalian legal order, writers usually
refer to processes of norm development in non-state arenas, the increasing importance of non-state actors such as non-Governmental organizations (“NGO”) and multinational enterprises (“MNE”), the law-making
powers of international tribunals, and the emergence of general principles of global humanitarian law.10 However, despite the ongoing talk
about the demise of the Westphalian order, its underlying principles of
state sovereignty and state consent continue to play an important role in
the structure of various international legal regimes. It is interesting,
therefore, to consider the way in which the Westphalian scheme of validity (as postulated by Joseph Kunz and Leo Gross) is invoked in contemporary treaty regimes. This Section explores this question in the context
of two key treaty regimes: the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). I will argue that the invocation
of the Westphalian validity doctrine in these regimes generates deep inconsistencies that undermine its claim to provide coherent and complete
foundations for modern international law.
Exposing the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with the Westphalian doctrinal apparatus requires that I first elucidate the meaning of
paradox in both logic and law. This theoretical detour also lays the
groundwork for the broader thesis set forth in Sections IV and V of this
Article.
A. Detour: Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law
1. Paradoxes: A General Exposition
What do we mean by the concept of “paradox”? The term is sometimes
used informally to designate a statement that conflicts with the common
view.11 Within the realm of law, this understanding can be applied to any
legal claim that challenges a received legal opinion. I am interested in
other forms of paradoxes—not paradoxes that reflect a transitory inter-

10. For a general discussion of the demise of the Westphalian paradigm, see Gunther
Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3–30 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Berman, supra note 6, at 487–
88.
11. Thus, the definition of paradox in the Oxford Dictionary opens with: “Statement
contrary to received opinion.” THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH
880 (5th ed. 1964).
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pretative dispute but, rather, those that expose a deeper social and linguistic problematic.
Philosophical literature offers various definitions of this more challenging understanding of the concept of paradox. One view focuses on
the deep inconsistency associated with paradoxes. Nicholas Rescher, for
example, defines paradox as a “set of propositions that are individually
plausible but collectively inconsistent.”12 Another view emphasises the
paradox’s problematical conclusion, taking paradox as “an argument that
begins with premises that appear to be clearly true, that proceeds according to inference rules that appear to be valid, but that ends in contradiction.”13 Other thinkers, such as W.V. Quine, have highlighted the reasoning pattern that generates the paradox: “[a]n antinomy produces a selfcontradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some
tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised.”14 In light of these general reflections, it
is possible to distinguish between two major types of paradoxes.15 Paradoxes of coherence expose a deep inconsistency in some well-defined set
of sentences or propositions,16 while semantical paradoxes involve notions of truth, falsity, and reference, and challenge the way we reason
with these notions.17

12. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PARADOXES: THEIR ROOTS, RANGE, AND RESOLUTION xxi
(Open Court Publishing Co. 2001).
13. Charles S. Chihara, The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation, 88
PHIL. REV. 590 (1979). For a similar view, see R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 1 (2d ed.
1995).
14. W.V. QUINE, THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 7 (Random House Publishers 1966).
15. This distinction is not exhaustive. See RESCHER, supra note 12, at 72–73.
16. I use the term “deep inconsistency” to distinguish such paradoxes from mere contradictions. The difference between the two terms lies in the way in which paradoxes
make the “contradiction appear inescapable.” See PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELFAMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 276 (Peter Lang
Publishing) (1990). I will sometimes use the term “logical paradoxes” to refer to this type
of paradoxes.
17. Another useful taxonomy is Quine’s distinction between “veridical” and “falsidical” paradoxes. QUINE, supra note 14, at 4–5. Veridical paradox is, in effect, a truthtelling argument or proof; it establishes that some proposition is true or false (e.g., the
Barber Paradox). Falsidical paradox, by contrast, “is one whose proposition not only
seems at first absurd but also is false, there being fallacy in the purported proof.” A typical example is Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Id. at 5.
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To get a better sense of the notion of paradox, let us examine a specific
and famous example, the paradox of the liar (“Liar Paradox”).18 Consider
the following sentence:
K1 This sentence is false. We can also present this sentence in the following format: K1
K1 is false.

K1 produces a paradoxical loop: if it is true, it is false, and if it is false,
it is true. Attributing a stable truth value to this sentence seems to be impossible. It is possible to structure a similar paradox that is heteroreferential, rather than self-referential. Consider the following set of sentences which, following Roy Sorensen, I will call the “Looped Liar Paradox”:19
Plato:

What Socrates says is true.

Socrates:

What Plato says is false.

Like the Liar Paradox, it is impossible to attribute stable and coherent
truth values to this pair.20
A feature common to both the Liar Paradox and the Looped Liar Paradox is their semantic instability: their perpetual oscillation between truth
and falsity.21 The Liar Paradox and the Looped Liar Paradox seem to
suffer from some kind of semantic pathology that is unsettling because of
the way in which it challenges our conventional grammatical structures
and our usage of basic notions such as truth and reference.22

18. The discussion of semantical paradoxes involves the question of the meaning of
truth and falsity. However, because of the deep controversy that exists within philosophy
with respect to the meaning of truth, I have decided not to delve into this question. Within
philosophy, one can find five major theories of truth: the Correspondence Theory; the
Semantic Theory; the Deflationary (or Minimalist) Theory; the Coherence Theory, and
the Pragmatic Theory. For a useful introduction to this debate, see Bradley Dowden &
Norman Swartz, Truth, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2007). Semantical paradoxes
create a problem, though, for each of these theories. One initial assumption that I do
make is that statements can be either true or false (the law of excluded middle).
19. ROY SORENSEN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARADOX: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
LABYRINTHS OF THE MIND 211 (Oxford University Press 2003). This version of the liar
can be traced back to the fourteenth century medieval thinker John Buridan. Id. at 201–
15.
20. One can construct a liar-like paradox that is non-circular. See Stephen Yablo,
Paradox Without Self-Reference, 53 ANALYSIS 251, 251 n.1 (1993).
21. Hans Herzberger, Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox, 79 J. PHIL. 479, 482
(1982).
22. See also Adam Reiger, The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence, 54
ERKENNTNIS 195 (2001).
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2. Paradoxes in Law: Incoherence and Paralysis
Logical and semantical paradoxes have existed for more than two
thousand years. Early versions of the Liar Paradox can be found in Christian scriptures and Greek and medieval writings.23 These paradoxes have
not, however, brought human thought to a standstill. While philosophers
have continued to deliberate about the proper solution to the Liar Paradox, people have continued to use the notions of truth and falsity in their
everyday reasoning and scientists have continued their search for true
descriptions. However, the presence of paradoxes and deep inconsistencies in the law seems more threatening and calls into question the capacity of the law to fulfill its function as a reliable arbiter of social conflicts
and as a source of normative expectations. Paradoxes can undermine
these legal functions, either by leading to paralysis and deadlocks or by
generating chaos and indeterminacy, causing people to replace the law
with other forms of governance.
Thus, the puzzle of legal paradoxicality deserves closer scrutiny. The
first step toward resolution of this puzzle is to identify the proper referent of legal paradoxes. The most suitable candidate for this role is what I
will call a “legal set”: a sequence of sentences that invoke, explicitly or
implicitly, the legal code (the distinction between legal and illegal). A
legal set may include three major types of normative sentences: norms,
norm-propositions (statements about norms), or meta-propositions
(statements about the entire legal system).24 These types of normative
sentences may be: prescriptive (ought to), permissive (may) or prohibitive (may not).25 Law includes additional types of norms, such as norms
23. SORENSEN, supra note 19, at 197. Other paradoxes, such as the paradoxes of motion attributed to Zeno, are also ancient. See id. at 49. Sorensen’s book provides a comprehensive discussion of the history of paradox.
24. See Jose Juan Moreso, Putting Legal Objectivity in its Place, 6 ANALISI E DIRITTO
243, 243 (G. Giappichelli ed., 2004) (“[L]egal knowledge is obtained from statements
like ‘Legally, all F have the obligation to pay T ’ or ‘Legally, x has the right to recover
damages D’. These statements express norm propositions. Norm propositions are the
meaings of norm statements. . . . Normative statements have a descriptive nature; they are
statements about the existence of norms. . . . Norm propositions about the existence of
legal norms can be called ‘legal propositions’.”) (citations omitted).
25. See Sven Ove Hansson, Situationist Deontic Logic, 26 J. PHIL. LOG. 423, 428
(1997). “All Israeli citizens are obligated not to emit sewage into the sea” is an example
of a prohibitive norm. “Israeli law prohibits the emission of sewage into the sea” is an
example of norm proposition; it is a proposition about the existence of a legal norm. “The
Israeli legal system is a combination of the common law and civil law traditions” is a
meta-proposition. Two other normative types that are mentioned in the literature are: “it
is gratuitous that” and “it is optional that.” Something is gratuitous if and only if it is not
obligatory, and it is optional if and only if neither it, nor its negation, is obligatory. See
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conferring public or private powers⎯ competence norms (the competence to issue other norms) or determinative norms (norms that define
certain concepts).26 One way in which a legal set may be formed is to
extract a segment from a law’s printed history (understood as the entire
genealogy of rules and case law pertaining to a particular legal domain).27 A paradox arises whenever a legal set, or a portion of it, is selfcontradictory, and when this self-contradiction is supported by apparently good reasons.28
Two primary features of legal paradoxes distinguish them from logical
and semantical paradoxes. These differences influence, as I will demonstrate, the practical consequences of paradoxes in law. The first distinctive feature of legal paradoxes concerns the unique composition of the
legal set. Because legal sets may include both norms and propositional
statements, their contradictory form is not limited to conflicting attributions of truth and falsity.29 This is because norms are usually thought to
lack truth value.30 The second distinctive feature of legal paradoxes, to
which I will return later in Sections IV and V, relates to their dynamic
quality. It reflects the fact that law is a social system and not a static register of norms. In other words, legal paradoxes influence the world of
action and should be examined with this in mind.
Let me delay, for a moment, the discussion of the systemic impact of
legal paradoxes and consider them in light of the peculiarities of a legal
Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.2
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/
logic-deontic/#1.2.
26. For these additional types, see Eugenio Bulygin, On Norms of Competence, 11
LAW & PHIL. 201 (1992).
27. But one can also form a legal set by using second-order observations of the law—
for example, by giving an account of a certain theory of law. Theorizing in law reflects
either an attempt to study “how far principles, notions, and rules for decision-making can
be generalized,” or a meta-attempt to expose the general structure of the law. NIKLAS
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 54–55 (Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David
Schiff & Rosamund Ziegert eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Oxford University Press 2004)
(1993). For more on the role and nature of legal theories, see David E. Van Zandt, The
Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 10 (1989).
28. A different but related problem is indeterminacy. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the Truth-Teller Paradox).
29. However, norm-propositions—propositions that state that a given action is obligatory (required), permitted (allowed), or forbidden (prohibited) according to a given
norm—can have truth value.
30. As Henrik von Wright puts it: “Norms as prescriptions of human conduct . . . may
be pronounced (un)reasonable, (un)just, or (in)valid when judged by some standards
which are themselves normative—but not true or false.” Georg Henrik von Wright, Is
There a Logic of Norms, 4 RATIO JURIS 265, 266 (1991).
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set. I do not intend to provide a formal account of the way in which legal-oriented sentences can relate to or contradict each other.31 For my
purposes, it will suffice to give an intuitive account of what is unique in
legal inconsistency and provide a few paradigmatic examples. A legal set
may be inconsistent when it can be shown to contain contradictory
norms. Norms or rules can be contradictory, for example, when one rule
permits what another forbids, or when two rules issue contradictory directives, such that simultaneous compliance with both directives is impossible.32 A further form of inconsistency arises when one can find conflicting interpretations of the same legal concept within a legal set. Another form of inconsistency arises when one can show that a legal set
contains contradictory assignments of validity. The notion of validity
plays, as I will argue later, a unique role in the law⎯something akin to
the notion of truth in logic. It is the validity of the law that makes its
normative statements binding.33
Let us consider two examples of legal paradoxes, beginning with a legal version of the Liar Paradox. I follow the conventional Deontic notation with OBp denoting “it is obligatory that p.”
O1 It is obligatory not to follow this rule. This can also be presented
as: O1
O~O1.34

This statement (interpreted as a norm rather than as a normproposition) is self-contradictory⎯it generates conflicting directives. It
is similar to the following prescription:
O2 It is obligatory not to smoke in bars and it is obligatory to smoke in
bars.

The self-contradictory nature of O1 and O2 makes it impossible to satisfy them⎯their satisfaction set is empty. Impossibility is the pathological symptom that accompanies normative contradiction.35

31. Deontic logic represents an attempt to provide such a formalistic account. However, this formalistic presentation is not really necessary for the arguments presented
here. See, e.g., id.; McNamara, supra note 25, § 1.2.
32. See von Wright, supra note 30, at 270–71. This form of inconsistency could give
rise to conflicting normative expectations.
33. Note, however, that since legal sets may also include “normal” propositions, and
may invoke classical reasoning patterns (even if this is done only implicitly and nonexclusively), they can also be contradictory in the sense that this notion is used in propositional logic (i.e., through inconsistent attributions of truth and falsity). On the role of
classical deductive patterns in legal reasoning, see generally Arend Soeteman, Legal
Logic? Or Can We Do Without?, 11 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 197 (2003).
34. McNamara, supra note 25, § 1.2.
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The paradoxes of law tend, however, to be more subtle than these examples. So let us consider a less blunt example. This example follows the
Greek story of Protagoras and Euathlus. I will follow the story as it was
told by Aulus Gellius.36 Protagoras, “the keenest of all Sophists,” taught
rhetoric and argumentation.37 Euathlus, who wished to be instructed in
the art of oratory and the pleading of causes (what is called law today),
became a pupil of Protagoras. 38 It was agreed between the two that
Euathlus would pay Protagoras’s fee after Euathlus won his first case.39
After having been a pupil and follower of Protagoras for some time, and
having made considerable progress in the study of oratory, Euathlus had
not undertaken any cases.40 Protagoras decided to demand his fee according to the contract, and he brought a suit against Euathlus.41
Protagoras and Euathlus presented their arguments before the court.
Protagoras began as follows:
Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will
have to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced
for or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be
due me in accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the

35. I follow Vranas here. See Peter B.M. Vranas, New Foundations for Deontic
Logic: A Preliminary Sketch 4, available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~vranas/
Homesite/papers/deonticweb.doc (2002). Note, however, that while O1 and O2 are selfcontradictory, a norm-proposition that describes a norm that is self-contradictory can be
true and non-contradictory. See Lennart Aqvist, Interpretations of Deontic Logic, 73
MIND 246, 249 (1964). It is also possible to construct looped contradictory obligations
with similar consequences:
O3 You ought to follow rule O4.
O4 You ought not to follow rule O3.
36. 1 AULUS GELLIUS, THE ATTIC NIGHTS OF AULUS GELLIUS 404–09 (E.H. Warmington ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Harvard University Press rev. ed. 1970) (1927). All of the
following quotes are from Gellius, id. This account was written roughly six hundred
years after the events took place (if they did indeed occur) since it is assumed that Protagoras lived from 492 to 421 B.C.E. See J.A. Davison, Protagoras, Democritus, and
Anaxagoras, 3 CLASSICAL QUART. 33, 38 (1953). This paradox was discussed by other
ancient writers. See, e.g., Jordan Howard Sobel, The Law Student and his Teacher, LIII
THEORIA 1 (1987).
37. GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 405.
38. Id. Protagoras drafted the Constitution of Thuria and likely taught in the Sicilian
School of Rhetoric. Davison, supra note 36, at 33, 37.
39. Gellius writes that Euathlus paid Protagoras half of the fee before beginning his
lessons and agreed to pay the remaining half “on the day when he first pleaded before
jurors and won his case.” GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 407.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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decision be in your favour, the money will be due me according to our
contract, since you will have won a case.42

To this Euathlus replied:
I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading
my own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take
greater satisfaction in a victory in which I defeat you, not only in the
suit, but also in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgment be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour, according to their verdict nothing will be due
you, because I have won; but if they give judgment against me, by the
terms of our contract I shall owe you nothing, because I have not won a
case.43

Gellius concludes the story by noting that the court was struck by the
intricacy of the arguments and refused to give a ruling:
. . . the jurors, thinking that the plea on both sides was uncertain and insoluble, for fear that their decision, for whichever side it was rendered,
might annul itself, left the matter undecided and postponed the case to a
distant day. Thus a celebrated master of oratory was refuted by his
youthful pupil with his own argument, and his cleverly devised sophism failed.44

The story of Protagoras and Euathlus reveals an internal paradox
within the normative structure governing this case, leading⎯at least according to Gellius⎯to a decisional paralysis.45 To make the paradox
more precise, let us disentangle the story into a series of norms and
norm-propositions.

42.
43.
44.
45.

(1)

In deciding a contractual dispute, a court should
give effect to and enforce the contractual commitments made by the parties.

(2)

According to the contract made between Protagoras and Euathlus, Euathlus will pay the full
fee only after he won his first case. Protagoras
brought a suit against Euathlus claiming his fee.
This was Euathlus’s first case.

(3)

Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should
be rejected since, at the time the court was re-

Id.
Id. at 407–09.
GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 409.
Id. at 405.
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quired to give a ruling, the contractual condition
had not been fulfilled.
(4)

If the court rejects Protagoras’s suit (ruling for
Euathlus), it will, by this very act, fulfill the contractual condition, thus completing Protagoras’s
cause of action.46

(5)

Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should
be accepted.

(6)

If the court accepts Protagoras’s suit, Euathlus
will in fact lose; by its ruling, the court will
cause the contractual condition to not be fulfilled.

(7)

Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should
be rejected.

Statements (3), (5), and (7) are contradictory. Attempting to reason
about the correct legal answer leads to a seemingly insoluble oscillation,
in which a ruling for Euathlus leads to a ruling for Protagoras, which
leads to a ruling for Euathlus, ad infinitum.47 The paradox is generated by
the fact that⎯due to the contract’s peculiar structure⎯the correct legal
answer (which should be reflected in the ruling) depends in an unsettling
way on the court’s ultimate ruling.48 This pathological oscillation is similar to the semantic instability generated by the Liar Paradox; in the legal
context it may lead to judicial paralysis, as was reported by Gellius.49
However, in law, paralysis is not an acceptable option. Legal decisions,
unlike decisions in science, math, or philosophy, cannot be deferred to a
later date.50 That decisions must be made is, in itself, a basic norm of any
legal system.
Indeed, the praxis of law seems to adhere to this basic precept, showing few signs of paradoxical stoppages. This may signal that the role
46. This proposition builds on the fact that the ruling operates as a performative
speech-act. Such speech-acts have the capacity to make themselves true or binding by
being pronounced in adequate circumstances. See Lennart Aqvist, Some Remarks on
Performatives in the Law, 11 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 105, 106, 110 (2003).
47. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 10.
48. See id.
49. GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 405.
50. This is not always recognized by philosophers. Thus, Jordan Howard Sobel notes,
for example, that “rather than reach a final disposition in the case a court might be moved
to suspend the case, to put off or postpone judgment to a later day. This action could
recommend itself as a desperate expedient to avoid self-contradiction: deferral could
recommend itself to a court that considered, whether correctly or incorrectly, that it had
no other way out of a logical trap.” Sobel, supra note 36, at 4.
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paradoxes are playing in law is not really pathological. With this in mind,
let us return to the story of Protagoras and Euathlus. Despite its seeming
insolubility, there are several ways in which this paradox may be resolved (or dissolved). They are based on two primary techniques: introducing a distinction (reinterpretation) or appealing to external principles.51
Consider, first, the option of reinterpretation. The court has several
ways to reinterpret the foregoing problematic normative cluster. The first
option disentangles the temporal components of the paradox. In determining the status of the parties’ rights and obligations, the court does not
need to take a forward-looking approach; that is, it does not have to consider the consequences of its ruling on the parties’ contractual obligations. Rather it needs only to assess their rights as they are at the moment
of its decision. According to this interpretation, (3) represents the correct
decision, implying that Protagoras’s suit was premature, and (5) and (7)
are simply incorrect. This interpretation lays the foundation, though, for
a future suit by Protagoras.52
Another approach seeks to resolve the paradox by focusing on its selfreferential aspect. Thus, the phrase “first case” may be interpreted as not
applicable to a case involving Protagoras and Euathlus as parties, barring
the problematic self-reference that is generated by the contract. This requires us to reformulate (2), again resolving the paradox and leading to a
ruling against Protagoras.
While the foregoing solutions are not uniquely legal, the appeal to external principles reflects an alogical approach because it does not seek to
resolve the paradox through the introduction of further distinctions;
rather, it dissolves the paradox through an appeal to hierarchically superior normative principles. Thus, the court may invoke the “good-faith”
principle and conclude that Protagoras’s scheme was dishonest. Alternatively, the contract could be revised in equity. Euathlus could be ordered
to pay earnest money while making a reasonable effort to take on another
case or to pay reasonable sum for the time Protagoras had already devoted to his instruction.53

51. For a broader discussion of the problem of paradox resolution, see RESCHER, supra note 12, at 57–58.
52. This solution was pointed to by Leibniz, who discussed this paradox in one of his
papers. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 7–9. See also SUBER, supra note 16, at 242.
53. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 7–9.
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B. Paradoxes in the Westphalian Order: The Cases of the WTO and the
ICC
This Section explores the deep inconsistency that is associated with the
Westphalian scheme of validity as it is invoked in two key treatyregimes: the WTO and the ICC. This deep inconsistency is generated, as
we shall see, by the fact that both regimes cling to the traditional Westphalian scheme, while simultaneously introducing conflicting validation
and law-making techniques.
1. The Case of the WTO
“The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows
as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”54

At first glance, the WTO looks like a classic product of the Westphalian order. The WTO regime is the product of a complex web of treaties that were signed in 1994 after a long negotiation process during the
Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994.55 The constitutional core of this web
consists of two agreements: the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (“WTO Agreement”), which is the umbrella instrument,
and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), which establishes the WTO legal system.56
The WTO Agreement includes various provisions that allude to the
Westphalian notion of validation, with its emphasis on state consent and
the associated ideal of national sovereignty. Thus, for example, Article
XIV (which deals with “Acceptance, Entry into Force, and Deposit”) and
Article XII (which deals with “Accession”) provide that accepting the
authority of the WTO requires a formal act from the joining state.57 The
WTO does not claim to have universal jurisdiction. In the same spirit,
Article XV (which deals with the issue of “Withdrawal”) states that

54. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 1
(2007), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf.
55. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (3rd ed. 2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
56. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, art. III(3), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33
I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The DSU is annexed to the WTO Agreement and
thus derives its validity from the former agreement. Id.
57. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. XIV, XII,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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“[a]ny Member may withdraw from this Agreement.”58 Similarly, the
DSU includes a provision which seeks to protect the rights of member
states and to preclude the possibility that these rights will be altered by
the WTO judicial bodies. Article 3.2 of the DSU states that:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations
of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.59

The Westphalian vision, reflected in the provision quoted above, postulates the dispute settlement body as a highly controllable entity that is
completely dependent on the states that have established it. Article 3.2 of
the DSU gives the WTO judicial bodies a very limited role: they are expected merely to preserve the rights and obligations of members under
the covered agreements and to clarify their meaning.60 Article 3.2 thus
portrays the WTO as a static normative space, whose contours were totally determined by the member states.
This portrait of the WTO system fails to appreciate, however, the
highly autonomous character of the WTO legal system.61 It disregards
the powers of the WTO’s new legal system, which⎯contrary to the
above portrait⎯has been actively shaping the normative field of the
WTO, independently of the wishes and preferences of the member
states.62 This autonomy is formally codified in articles 16.4, 17.14, and
23 of the DSU, which jointly transform the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism into an obligatory system, insulated from political intervention.63 In various rulings since 1995, the WTO judicial bodies have created new rights and obligations that did not exist as such before these

58. Id. art. XV.
59. DSU, supra note 56, art. 3.2 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. This tension is also highlighted by Sol Picciotto: “The WTO’s dispute settlement
procedures involved a significant shift toward a more legalistic model of adjudication
than in the GATT. . . . Nevertheless, the legitimacy of WTO rules is still defended on the
grounds that they have been agreed by governments.” Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE
477, 495 (2005).
62. Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303,
347 (2004).
63. DSU, supra note 56, arts. 16.4, 17.14, 23.
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decisions and depart substantively from the legal tradition of the
GATT.64
2. The International Criminal Court
“The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent,
permanent court that tries persons accused of the most serious
crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.”65

A similar tension also exists in the new regime of the International
Criminal Court. The ICC was created after long and protracted negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 July
1998.66 The Rome Statute provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction
over crimes of genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain
war crimes.67 On first reading, the ICC seems like another prototype of
the Westphalian model⎯a treaty produced through inter-state bargaining. This conclusion is supported by Article 126(1) of the Rome Statute,
which stipulates that the Statute shall enter into force after the deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.68 This provision refers
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda as the treaty’s source of validity.
The Westphalian order also underlies Article 4(2), which deals with the
legal status and powers of the ICC. Article 4(2) provides that “[t]he
Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute,

64. On the norm-making powers of the WTO tribunals, see Guzman, supra note 62, at
347; Picciotto, supra note 61, at 495; OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT 65–80
(Hart Publishing 2004). Two prominent examples of law made by the WTO judicial bodies are the Appellate Body decisions that both it and the panels have wide discretion to
accept amicus curiae briefs from non-state parties and its novel interpretation of Article
XX. For a discussion of these issues see PEREZ, supra, at 65–80, 100–05. See Appellate
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
¶¶ 79–91, 99–110 WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products ¶¶ 50–57, 155–157 WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
65. International Criminal Court, About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html
(last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
66. United Nations, United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, http://www.un.org/news/facts/iccfact.htm (last visited
Oct. 5, 2007).
67. Rome Statute of the International Court art. 5, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome
Statute is also commonly referred to as the ICC Treaty.
68. Id. art. 126(1).
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on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.”69
However, upon closer inspection, the Rome Statute seems to include
provisions that challenge the Westphalian validity scheme.70 This is reflected in its claim to hold jurisdiction over citizens of non-parties,71 in
the establishment of new universal criminal norms that transcend customary international law as it existed prior to the establishment of the
Rome Statute,72 in the formal legal recognition of non-state actors (victims and NGOs),73 and finally, in the decision-making powers that are
given to the Court.74
It is worthwhile to explore the nearly universal jurisdiction given to the
Court in Article 12, which provides the Court with jurisdiction over persons who are not citizens of one of the signatories to the ICC.75 According to Article 12, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute a national of any
state when crimes within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction are
committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the treaty or that
consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.76 The Court is thus empowered
to exercise jurisdiction even in cases in which the defendant’s state of
nationality is not a party to the treaty and does not consent to the exercise
of jurisdiction.77 The jurisdictional principle underlying Article 12 stands
in stark contrast to the constitutional principle of state consent. This de69. Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added).
70. For a more detailed discussion of the tension between the ICC regime and the
Westpahlian validity scheme, see Jackson N. Maogoto, The Final Balance Sheet? The
International Criminal Court’s Challenges and Concessions to the Westphalian Model 4,
14 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 1402, 2006), available at
http://law.bpress.com/expresso/eps/1402; Leila Nadya Sadat & Richard Carden, The New
International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385, 390–91
(2000); Morris, supra note 8, at 30–33.
71. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art. 12.
72. Id. arts. 5–8.
73. Id. art. 15 (providing that the prosecutor may initiate investigations on the basis of
information received from non-governmental organizations). See also Maogoto supra
note 70, at 7.
74. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art. 19(1) (“The Court shall satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”); id. art. 21 (providing the Court with the
power to derive new international legal principles from “national laws of legal systems of
the world,”); id. art. 119(1) (endowing the Court with the authority to settle disputes
“concerning the judicial functions.”). See also Morris, supra note 8, at 30–33.
75. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art 12.
76. Id. art. 12(2)(a). This is in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant’s state of nationality.
77. Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6 (2000); Morris, supra note 8, at 13–14.
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viation is particularly striking when the Rome Statute is compared to the
ICJ Statute and the ICJ jurisdictional jurisprudence.78
Some proponents of the ICC regime have tried to explain this internal
inconsistency by arguing that the ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of
non-party states is based, in effect, on existing principles of customary
international law. According to this view, the ICC jurisdiction is based
upon:
. . . the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant to which the courts
of any state may prosecute the nationals of any state for certain serious
international crimes. Since any individual state could prosecute perpetrators regardless of their nationality, they reason, a group of states may
create an international court empowered to do the same.79

In a recent article, Madeline Morris demonstrated that this thesis has
no basis in contemporary customary international law.80 She argues that
the delegated universal jurisdiction theory does not account for a number
of crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC that are not
subject to universal jurisdiction.81 Additionally, the intricate institutional
structure established by the Rome Statute, with the unique enforcement
and interpretative powers it provides to the court and the prosecutor, creates a legal environment that is radically different from the one envisioned by the decentralized model that existed prior to the establishment
of the ICC.82 Thus, consent to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by
individual states is not equivalent to consent to universal jurisdiction
delegated to an international court.83
III. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF NORMATIVE GROUNDING
The Westphalian doctrine of validity, with its emphasis on consensual
norm creation through state negotiation, does not seem to cohere with
contemporary legal practices. The normative deficit that was created by
the demise of the Westphalian scheme is being populated by alternative
forms of validation. Four legal ideas emerge as particularly noteworthy
in this respect, and I will discuss each of them briefly: global democracy,
deference to non-legal rationalities, direct individual consent, and the
new association between law and technology. These alternative schemes
78. See Morris, supra note 8, at 20–21.
79. Id. at 27–28. See also Paust, supra note 77, at 3.
80. Morris, supra note 8, at 13, 56–60.
81. Id. at 28.
82. See id. at 29.
83. Id. Some authors have tried to explain ICC jurisdiction by appealing to universal
moral principles. I will return to the issue in Section III.B.
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challenge the classic conceptions of international law, generating a new
and deeply complex legal universe.84 However, as we consider each of
these alternative schemes more closely, it becomes obvious that the project of providing solid foundations to the international legal system fails
not just because of the deep differences between these varied normative
schemes, but also because when considered separately, they yield inconsistencies that are as problematic as the ones generated by the conventional Westphalian doctrine. These horizontal and intrinsic paradoxes
cast doubt upon the claim that these alternative doctrines provide a new,
universal model of validity.
A. Global Democracy?
Global democracy is invoked increasingly⎯in both theory and practice⎯as a new form of validation that imagines the democratic principle
as a truly global idea, undercutting the role of the state.85 Unlike the idea
of global democracy, the Westphalian doctrine has limited aspirations
regarding the regulation of the political process.86 The consent requirement underlying the Westphalian doctrine was interpreted as a purely
formalistic condition of constitutional adequacy87 that does not set substantive requirements to national political structures. Some authors have
argued that the Westphalian principle of consent should be read as a requirement to subject the transnational diplomatic process to substantial
84. This complexity cannot be captured by unidimensional concepts such as the “proliferation of international courts.” Guillaume Speech 2000, supra note 1. For a discussion
of this complexity in the context of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), see Maria Panezi & Peer Zumbansen, The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with author).
85. The most prominent voice in this school of thought is that of David Held. See,
e.g., David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?, 29 REV. INT’L STUD. 465,
472 (2003).
86. Thus, in the Vienna Convention the only hint of tension between the formal consent of the state and the will of the people is indirect. Article 46 provides that:
(1) A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance;
(2) A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith.
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 46 (emphasis added).
87. Id. art. 7.
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domestic political scrutiny; this interpretation seeks to portray the act of
consent as a product of meaningful political deliberation.88 However,
under the Westphalian scheme, the state retains the authority to structure
the domestic political process.89 Further, the political model that emerges
from this interpretation is highly fragmented⎯unlike the unified vision
underlying the model of global democracy.90
However, choosing the principle of global democracy as an alternative
source of validity raises various difficulties pertaining both to its theoretical underpinnings and to its global applicability. From a theoretical
perspective, the vision of global democratization is torn between several
potentially conflicting commitments. The proponents of global democratization invoke several core commitments: first, a commitment to inclusiveness and open decision-making structures; second, a commitment to
a decision-making process that is based on the possibility of reaching
agreement through rational deliberation; third, a commitment to individual freedom and fundamental human rights; fourth, a commitment to the
value of cultural pluralism; and finally, a commitment to embed these
core commitments in global governance institutions.91
These commitments conflict in various ways. First, the establishment
of strong global institutions⎯replacing the fragmented and relatively
weak bodies that characterize the contemporary international order⎯is in
tension with the commitment to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. As the distance between the global political center and the citizen
body grows, so does the risk that the voice of the citizen and the local
community will be ignored. A strong central establishment constitutes,
therefore, a risk to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. Second, it
is not clear whether the commitment to open deliberation and consensual
decision-making can be realized, given the vast cultural and ideological
differences that characterize the contemporary global society. It is not
clear what kind of criteria could guide this deliberative effort, given that
choosing any particular criterion could jeopardize the commitment to
pluralism. The political institutions of majority voting and parliamentary
representation offer a way to circumvent this normative deficit, but they
do not resolve it.
88. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic
Law: Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 231 (1999).
89. Held, supra note 85, at 466.
90. Id.
91. See generally Held, supra note 85; Michael Walzer, International Society: What is
the Best that We Can Do? (Sch. of Soc. Sci. Inst. for Advanced Study, Occasional Papers
No. 8, 2000), available at http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/papereight.pdf.
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These dilemmas have been apparent in the few attempts to implement
the vision of global democracy. Thus, for example, in 2000, the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) made an ambitious attempt to develop a governance structure based on an electronically-mediated model of representative democracy.92 ICANN tried to use
the Internet to create legitimacy, first by opening its decision-making
process to the public (transparency), and second, by conducting global,
Internet-based elections for its central governing body (the At-Large
Membership Program).93 ICANN’s experiment was heavily criticized
due to its failure to achieve true global representation and responsiveness
to civic concerns, leading the organization to abandon its ambitious democratic aspirations.94 Other institutions⎯such as the Global Reporting
Initiative (“GRI”)⎯have established multi-stakeholder consultation
processes, reflecting a commitment to consensual decision-making.95
Despite the relative success of the GRI, the consultation procedures it
established do not constitute a formal democratic structure; to some extent, the success of the GRI may be attributed to the limited
field⎯sustainability reporting—in which it operated.96 The tensions that
underlie the theoretical articulations of the idea of global democracy
were not resolved by the few practical attempts to design global democratic institutions. The idea of global democratization remains a deeply
contested notion, both in theory and in practice.

92. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policies,
http://www.icann.org/udrp/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
93. John G. Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global
Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 410, 412–414 (2004).
94. ICANN’s experiment failed in the sense that ICANN has radically changed its
governance structure by adopting a much milder concept of democracy. Nonetheless,
ICANN’s experiment still constitutes an important milestone in the attempt to transform
the abstract idea of global democratization into a practical model. For a detailed discussion and critique of ICANN’s democratic experiment, see Palfrey, supra note 93, at 412.
95. For details about the GRI, see Global Reporting Initiative [GRI],
http://www.globalreporting.org. The World Wide Web Consortium provides another
example of an attempt to design global standards through multi-stakeholder consultation.
See World Wide Web Consortium, http://www.w3.org/. The rule-making process at the
International Organization for Standardization is a good example of a consensual structure among closed communities. See Oren Perez, Global Legal Pluralism and Electronic
Democracy, in ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: MOBILISATION, ORGANIZATION AND
PARTICIPATION VIA NEW ICTS 133, 133, 143–44 (Rachel K. Gibson, Andrea Roemmele &
Stephen J. Ward eds., Routledge 2004).
96. I discuss the institutional structure of the GRI in more detail in the last section of
this Article. See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text.
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B. Deference to Non-Legal Rationality
The attempt to look for grounding in external, non-legal rationalities
has been most visible in the field of human rights. The appeal to universal moral principles as a ground for new global legal norms is particularly noteworthy in two contexts: the problematic jurisdiction of the ICC
and the question of humanitarian intervention. Some authors have tried
to justify the novel ICC jurisdiction by what amounts, in effect, to a direct appeal to moral principles.97 The ICC Treaty belongs, it was argued,
to a new genre of treaties that are “globally binding because they foster
the common interests of humanity.”98 In the context of humanitarian intervention, authors have argued for the emergence of a new grund norm:
a principle of civilian inviolability.99
However, the appeal to this new source of validity seems problematic
not only because the choice of the pivotal norm seems somewhat arbitrary, but also because the meaning of the proposed norms remains extremely fuzzy. As Madeline Morris argued in a recent article:
A threshold problem with the theory of global treaties is that there will
inevitably be disagreement about what in fact will serve the common
interests of humanity. An equally formidable problem confronting the
theory of global treaties is that, even if that which would serve the
common interests of humanity could be dispositively identified, that
alone would not bind states who would find unacceptable a particular
distribution of the burdens involved in serving those interests.100

97. Morris, supra note 8, at 26.
98. Id. at 52.
99. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William W. Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2002). Other authors have proposed a different
principle, “a responsibility to protect.” See, e.g., Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The
Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 99, 101 (2002); Bruce, W. Jentleson, A Responsibility to Protect, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 18, 18 (2007). See also Held, supra note 91,
at 471–72 (arguing for a new global order based on two meta-moral principles: the
metaprinciple of autonomy and the metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning). For a critique
of the Slaughter and Burke-White view (which is applicable to the other proposals), see
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty via International Constitutional Moments? The Case of Afghanistan, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER
THE END OF THE COLD WAR 335 (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Michael Bothe & Natalino
Ronzitti eds., Transnational Pub. 2005); Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire
Versus International Law, 18 ETHICS AND INT’L AFF. 1 (2004).
100. Morris, supra note 8, at 52.
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The deep vagueness of these new postulated norms calls for further interpretation and sets the ground for interpretative disputes.101 It is not
clear what criteria will govern such disputes or which authority will decide them. The suggested new grund norms do not resolve these questions.
Similar appeals to non-legal rationalities can be found in other domains. In the environmental domain, we can find reference to a new environmental ethics, epitomized in the concept of sustainable development102 and in the precautionary principle.103 Environmental ethics provides an additional and independent mode of justification, operating
alongside other forms of groundings.104 Science has also been used increasingly as a mode of grounding, especially in the trade and environment domains.105 In both of these domains, the problems of choosing
between the competing external sources and the indeterminacy of the
external principles remain unresolved.106 We are confronted, again, not
101. Similar problems afflict the question of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions Under
International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1 (2001).
102. On the principle of sustainable development, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 13–17, 373–75 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood
eds., Hart Pub. 2006).
103. On the precautionary principle, see id. at 361–64.
104. Two prominent examples are the WTO Agreement, which includes in its preamble a reference to the principle of sustainable development, and the GRI 2006 sustainability guidelines, which open with a reference to the principle of sustainable development.
WTO Agreement, supra note 57, pmbl.; GRI, G3 Guidelines, http://www.global
reporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF2-5F735235CA44/0/G3_Guide
linesENU.pdf at 2 [hereinafter GRI G3]. The WTO tribunals have relied on the invocation of the principle of sustainability in justifying their new (pro-environment) interpretation of article XX. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 153, 155. For a discussion of
the WTO trade and environment jurisprudence, see PEREZ, supra note 64, at 65–80.
105. A good example is the deference to science in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) definition of risk
assessment, in which science rather than law provides the criteria for proper risk assessment. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, arts, 2, 5,
Annex A(4) 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. For a discussion, see PEREZ, supra note 64, at 155–158.
The Climate Change Convention provides another example through its reliance on the
work and judgment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”). See
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2007).
106. See e.g., Oren Perez, The Institutionalization of Inconsistency: From Fluid Concepts to Random Walk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW 119, 128–36 (Oren
Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., 2006); Oren Perez, Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: Reflections on the GMO Panel’s Decision, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 265, 265, 267
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just by conflicting interpretations of the same extra-legal authority (e.g.,
environmental ethics), but also by deep uncertainty as to how these divergent authorities relate to each other. There seems to be no agreement
with respect to how these competing forms of rationality could be ranked
and their domains of applicability defined. Indeed, there is no unified
moral theory that could bring these different world views under a single
umbrella in a way that would be globally accepted (successfully bridging
between the cultural-moral disagreements that characterize the contemporary global society).
C. Individual Consent
The doctrine of individual consent forms a third pattern of validation.
The idea of individual consent draws both on universal principles of contract law and on the ethos of liberal individualism, with its strong emphasis on freedom of choice and self-determination.107 This form of validation claims to free international law from its traditional reliance on the
state as a necessary perquisite for the making of global norms. The concept of individual consent plays a particularly central role in two fields of
international law: international arbitration and Internet law. Yet, as with
the other techniques, this concept yields deep and unresolved puzzles.
Consider first the arbitration field. An increasing number of international disputes are being adjudicated today in global arbitration centers.108 This trend can be attributed both to the legal regime, which was
created by the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and to a general expansion in the
number of international business transactions.109 The New York Conven(2007) (with respect to the vagueness of the precautionary principle); David G. Victor,
Recovering Sustainable Development, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 91, 92 (2006) (noting with respect to the vagueness of the sustainability paradigm that “UN summits . . . have yielded
broad and incoherent documents and policies. Sustainable development, the compass that
was designed to show the way to just and viable economics, now swings in all directions.”).
107. See Barry Schwartz, Self-determination: The Tyranny of Freedom, 55 AM.
PSYCHOL. 79 (2000); Wendy Larner, Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality,
63 STUD. POL. ECON. 5 (2000).
108. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical
Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 537 (2005) (reporting an
increase in the number of arbitration requests filed with the International Court of Arbitration from 1999–2003).
109. Pedro Martinez-Fraga, The Convergence of Legal Cultures in Arbitration and
Amendments to the New York Convention: If it is Not Broken, Why Fix it, but if it is
Good, Make it Better, in JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES, at 1, 12 (Miami-Florida European Union Center No. 20, 2006). A similar increase has taken place in
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tion ensures worldwide exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration proceedings
based on valid arbitration agreements, provides procedures for the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, and limits the grounds on
which domestic courts can refuse requests for enforcement to a few basic
procedural defects.110 The New York Convention is not, therefore, just a
mechanism of enforcement: through the principle of non-interference, it
has facilitated the emergence of a new global law that is insulated from
the influence of inter-state politics.111 The normative space that was created by the New York Convention has been filled by a new a-national
system of international commercial law, the new lex mercatoria,112 and a
new institutional apparatus comprised of independent arbitrators and
several permanent arbitral centers such as the International Chamber of
Commerce International Court of Arbitration (“ICA”), the London Court
of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), and the US International Centre
for Dispute Resolution.113 But trying to unfold the normative status of
this new nexus of norms and institutions reveals a deep puzzle. How can
a system that is based on disaggregated and discontinuous contractual
arrangements (arbitration clauses),114 also claim simultaneously a continuous and permanent legal presence?
the field of investment arbitration. See Luke Eric Peterson, The Global Governance of
Foreign Direct Investment: Madly Off in All Directions, No. 19, at 12–14, Occasional
Papers, Dialogue Globalization (May 2005).
110. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
111. As of March 12, 2007, the Convention had 142 parties. Updated data about the
status of the Convention can be found on UNCITRAL’s Web site. See UNCITRAL,
Status 1958–Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_
status.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
112. Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627, 627–30 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries:
Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L.
197, 198 (2004).
113. See International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration; London Court of International Arbitration,
http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/; American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org.
For other International Arbitration Centers, see International Business—Arbitration Centers, http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Organizations/International__Organizations/
arbitration_centers.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
114. The reliance on arbitration clauses is reflected both in the language of the New
York Convention, which limits its jurisdiction to valid arbitral agreements, see New York
Convention, supra note 110, art. II(3), and in the Web sites of the arbitral centers mentioned above, which provide their prospective clients with recommended arbitration
clauses, see the Web sites of the ICA and LCIA, supra note 113. A typical arbitration
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The ICA constitutes a particularly fascinating example of this existential paradox. The ICA Dispute Resolution Rules115 draw their validity
from the parties’ consent.116 In contrast to conventional arbitration, the
ICC Rules provide the ICA with the authority to scrutinize an award.117
Under the ICC Rules, the arbitral tribunal is required to submit its award
in draft form to the ICA. According to Article 27:
Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft
form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the
form of the Award and, without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s liberty
of decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. No
Award shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its form.118

Commentators note that in scrutinizing the award, the ICA focuses on
issues such as the completeness of the award, its adherence to the ICC
Rules and the governing national law, internal consistency, and whether
it is sufficiently reasoned before authorizing its issuance to the parties.119
Although the Court cannot compel the arbitrators to take account of its
comments with respect to substance, arbitrators usually take notice of the
Court’s comments, at least to some extent.120 The Court does not provide
the parties with the reasons for its decision. It seems, then, that by giving
their consent to ICC arbitration, parties give their agreement not only to
adjudicate before an arbitrator according to the law of their choosing, but

clause states: “All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall
be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.” International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, http://www.iccw
bo.org/court/arbitration/id4114/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
115. International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration Dispute
Resolution Rules, http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_
arb_english.pdf.
116. Id. art. 6.
117. The ICA’s role is defined in Article 1 of the Rules, and in Appendices I and II
thereof. Id. art. 1, apps I, II. According to Article 1(2), “The Court does not itself settle
disputes. It has the function of ensuring the application of these Rules. It draws up its
own Internal Rules.” Id. art. 1(2).
118. According to Appendix II, Article 6, “When the Court scrutinizes draft Awards in
accordance with Article 27 of the Rules, it considers, to the extent practicable, the requirements of mandatory law at the place of arbitration.” Id. app. II, art. 6.
119. Ellis Baker and Anthony Lavers, Review of Arbitrators’ Exercise of Power in
English Law: The House of Lords Decides, 22 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 493, 499–
500 (2005).
120. Id.
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also to the elusive and autonomous jurisprudence of the ICA.121 Thus, the
ICA’s powers and the normative force of its jurisprudence rest, miraculously, on the disaggregated and prospective contractual arrangements of
its current and future “clients.”
Internet law provides another example of the invocation of individual
consent as an independent grounding. Two prominent examples are
ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDDRP”)122 and the World Wide Web Consortium Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (“P3P”).123 Similar to the world of arbitration,
the force of ICANN’s dispute resolution policy and the P3P code stems
from the direct consent of the concerned individuals⎯without the mediation of the state. In the case of ICANN’s dispute settlement policy, consent is given in the contract signed between a domain-name holder and a
registrar.124 In the case of P3P, the platform is incorporated into the architecture of the browsers and the Web sites, and consent is implied from
the purchase or usage of the browser.125 The global code is reinterpreted
in these cases as a contract⎯a true manifestation of the idea of social
contract.126

121. The London Court of International Arbitration has a somewhat similar dual architecture; the powers of the London Court are, however, more limited. See LCIA Arbitration Rules arts. 3, 29, http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/arb_english_main.htm.
122. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy [UDDRP],
http://www.icann.org/udrp/. The policy is applicable across all generic top level domains
(.aero, .biz, .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro, .tel and
.travel). The policy provides for obligatory international arbitration for disputes arising
from alleged abusive registrations of domain names (for example, cybersquatting). The
arbitration proceedings may be initiated by a holder of trademark rights. The UDDRP is a
policy between a registrar and its customer and is included in registration agreements for
all ICANN-accredited registrars. For a list of approved dispute-resolution service providers, see ICANN, Approved Providers, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approvedproviders.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
123. Platform for Privacy Preferences [P3P], http://www.w3.org/P3P/. The Platform
for Privacy Preferences Project enables Web sites to express their privacy practices in a
standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents.
P3P user agents allow users to be informed of site practices (in both machine- and human-readable formats) and to automate decision-making based on these practices when
appropriate. Thus, users need not read the privacy policies at every site they visit. Id.
124. ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policies: Eligibility Requirements Dispute Resolution Policy, para. 1, http://www.icann.org/udrp/erdrppolicy.html.
125. In some cases, the browser is already installed on the computer when it is purchased; consent is then indicated through the act of purchase.
126. For a general discussion of the social contract, see S.A. Lloyd, Hobbes’s Moral
and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E.N. Zalta ed.,
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This new form of validity finds resonance in the ideas of individual integrity and individual empowerment that are central to contemporary
Western culture. On close scrutiny, however, postulating individual consent as a validating force seems highly problematic. In the case of arbitration, the gap between the disaggregated and discontinuous contractual
consent, the permanent nature of the lex mercatoria, and some of the new
arbitral centers seems unbridgeable. In the case of the new global Internet codes, the invocation of consent does not seem to cohere with the
traditional understanding of consent in contract law: the image of “two
autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by binding
themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange.”127 Can one seriously
speak about consent in the context of ICANN’s policy and the P3P code
if the individual in question has not taken part in the negotiation of the
code or contract in question, and in effect, has no choice but to accept it
if he wants to register a domain name or enjoy some kind of privacy protection as he surfs the Net?128
If one rejects individual consent as an acceptable form of validation,
perhaps there is no choice but to look for alternative groundings. Thus, in
the case of the lex mercatoria, can one appeal to universal principles of
commercial law⎯a natural law of contracts? And, in the case of the
UDDRP and the P3P standards, where validity may reside, not in the
fictitious consent, but in the process through which they were developed⎯their invocation of notions such as democracy and procedural justice?
The increasingly blurred normative reality that characterizes the contemporary international legal universe provides wide occasion for horizontal conflicts between different forms of validation. The field of investment disputes provides a particularly interesting example of this potential tension. There is a problematic interplay between forum selection
clauses that are included in individual investment contracts and arbitration procedures set out in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) interpreted in light of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment

2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/; Williamson M. Evers, Social Contract: A Critique 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 185 (1977).
127. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning
of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006). For further information on the problematic nature of contract formation in standard electronic contracts and the question of
privacy protection, see Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2005); Lisa M.
Austin, Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experience
Under PIPEDA, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 181, 191 (2006).
128. Recall that P3P is encoded in the architecture of both Web sites and browsers.
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Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”).129 The question raised in these conflicts is whether the forum selection clause can be seen as a waiver of BIT jurisdiction. In other words,
the question is whether the norm of the contract trumps the norm of the
treaty or vice versa. There is a diversity of opinion on this question.130
D. The Bundling of Law and Technology
Another highly novel source of global validity is the bundling of law
and technology. This new technique emerged as a side effect of the development of digital technology that allows the bundling of software and
norms in one digitized product.131 Such norm-in-the-machine products
have been available in various forms for some time. One example is the
domain of intellectual property rights (“IPR”). Instead of protecting IPR
in a certain product (e.g., software or music) through the use of contractual terms or by relying on state regulation, IPR can be protected from
violations with special software offering world-wide protection using
various technological means.132 Such technology is increasingly being
used in the fight against online file-sharing software.133 P3P provides
129. For the text of the ICSID Convention and details about the way it operates, see
The World Bank Group ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. As of April 10, 2006, 143 countries have ratified the Convention. The World Bank Group ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules, Introduction, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/intro.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
130. See Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (W. Bank) 1, 21–30
(2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2007); SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, (W. Bank) 1, 53–60 (2004), available at http://www.investment
claims.com/oa1.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007); Gerold Zeiler, Treaty v Contract: What is
the Best Venue for Investment Disputes?, AUSTRIAN ARB. Y.B. 323, 332–348 (2007);
Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance: Cost-Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 653, 676–679 (2006).
131. Machines are understood as devices for accomplishing a task as a collection of
functional components. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2002).
132. A good example is MediaMax. MediaMax is a copy-prevention software produced by SunnComm Technologies that is designed to prevent unauthorized copying of
audio
CDs
using
personal
computers.
See
MediaMax
Technology,
http://www.mediamaxtechnology.com/; John A. Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax
CD3 Copy-Prevention System, PRINCETON U. COMPUTER SCI. TECHNICAL REP. TR-679-03
(2003).
133. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon In Web War Over Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, FEB. 19, 2007, at C1. The new technological weapon in this case is based on content-recognition software, which makes it possible to identify copyrighted material and to
block it (unless it was licensed for use on the site). One of the key players in this field is
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another example. The P3P standard is integrated into software (browser)
and into the structure of Web sites (another type of machine).134 Another
example is new filtering software that is used to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Web.135 In this case, as in the
case of intellectual property rights, the software proclaims to fulfill a task
that was previously reserved to state regulation. What is common to all
these cases is the invocation of technology as a new type of (global)
grund norm.136
In Ashcroft v. ACLU,137 the U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when it noted that filtering software might more effectively protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet
than the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”).138 This led the Court to
the conclusion that COPA was unconstitutional (by violating the First
Amendment) because of the availability of less restrictive alternatives.139
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in terms of this
Article’s thesis regarding the fragmentation of the concept of validity lies

Audible Magic. See Audible Magic, http://www.audiblemagic.com/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2007).
134. On the structure of P3P technology, see Daniel J. Weitzner et al., Creating a Policy-Aware Web: Discretionary, Rule-based Access for the World Wide Web, in WEB AND
INFORMATION SECURITY 1, 6 (Elena Ferrari & Bhavani M. Thuraisingham eds., IRM Press
2006), available at http://www.w3.org/2004/09/Policy-Aware-Web-acl.pdf. See also
LORRIE CRANOR ET AL., THE PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES 1.1 (P3P1.1)
SPECIFICATION § 1.1.2 (2006), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11/.
135. For a discussion of blocking and filtering products, see Richard W. Boss, Meeting
CIPA Requirements with Technology, Am. Lib. Ass’n Technotes (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.pla.org/ala/pla/plapubs/technotes/internetfiltering.cfm (last visited Oct. 11,
2007).
136. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Radin, supra note 127; Margaret
Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 1 (2004).
137. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
138. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
139. Filtering software was seen as less restrictive because filters impose
selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at
the source. Under a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to speech
they have a right to see without having to identify themselves or provide their
credit card information. Even adults with children may obtain access to the
same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their home
computers. Further, promoting filter use does not condemn as criminal any
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least
much diminished.
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667.
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not in the particulars of American free speech doctrine, but in its de facto
recognition of technology as a source of private law.140
But the claim that technology acts as a new form of normative grounding seems to confuse the is and the ought⎯leaping from efficacy to normativity.141 This problematic has not escaped legal observers of modern
technology. Thus, for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(“EFF”) brought legal action against Sony BMG based on its distribution
of CDs that incorporated an IPR protection software.142 One of the claims
raised by EFF alleged that many consumers were not aware that the CDs
they bought included this software and that it was downloaded to their
computers without their consent.143 Once again, we see a conflict between two forms of validation: technology and individual consent.144
IV. TAKING A STEP BACK: HAVE WE EVER BEEN PURE?
A. Purity Revisited
The structure of contemporary international law is clearly incompatible
with the pure Westphalian conception of international law. Deeper reflection, however, exposes the purity of the Westphalian order as a fictitious construct, whose claim for coherence and completeness does not
stand up to scrutiny, even if we limit its domain of applicability to the
(distant) past. The impurity of the Westphalian scheme of validity becomes apparent almost immediately when considered from the perspec140. One can see a similar process taking place in the field of morality. See Bruno
Latour & Couze Venn, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 THEOR.
CULT. SOC. 247, 253–54 (2002).
141. This leap characterizes the concept of legal validity in general. See Csaba Varga,
Validity, 41 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 155 (2000). See also infra Section IV.B.
142. For other cases dealing with this problem, see, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v.
Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (2005); DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal.
2004).
143. Complaint ¶¶ 96–97, Hull v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment Corp., 2005 WL
3806321 (Nov. 21, 2005) (No. BC 343385). In response to the filing of the suit by the
EFF, SunnComm has undertaken a commitment to ensure that future versions of MediaMax will not install when the user declines the end user license agreement (“EULA”) that
appears when a CD is first inserted in a computer CD or DVD drive. SunnComm has also
agreed to include uninstallers in all versions of MediaMax software, to submit all future
versions to an independent security-testing firm for review, and to release to the public
the results of the independent security testing. Electronic Frontier Foundation, CD Copy
Protection Firm Promises Fix for Software Problems (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.eff.
org/news/archives/2006_02.php#004378. For the full litigation history, see Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Sony BMG Litigation Info, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/SonyBMG/#docs (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
144. Radin, supra note 127, at 1231.
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tive of simple logic. State will cannot be considered the ultimate source
of international law because it leaves unanswered the question of the
normative force of the rule that says that will binds. Thus, the force of
the norm pacta sunt servada must be assumed to derive⎯if we want to
avoid circularity⎯from a source that is independent of the will of
states.145 This has already been noted by various scholars of international
law. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht, in a book published in 1927,
notes:
To say that the binding force of treaties is derived from the will of contracting parties who, through an act of self-limitation, give up a part of
their sovereignty, is to leave unanswered the query why the treaty continues to be binding after the will of one party has undergone a change.
The will of the parties can never be the ultimate source of the binding
force of a contract whose continued validity is necessarily grounded in
a higher objective rule . . . it is the objective validity, independent of
the will of States, of the rule pacta sunt servanda which renders legally
possible the working of conventional international law.146

The attempt to resolve the question of the force of pacta sunt servanda
through appeal to a higher customary law faces similar difficulties. At
the level of customary international law, we have to cope with the parallel question of the source and status of the norms regulating the making
of customary international law. If the idea of customary international law
regulating itself does not seem satisfactory, we have no choice but to
imagine a higher level-law⎯an imaginary constitutional global
law⎯that will be the source of such norms.147
But the impurity of the Westphalian model does not lie just in its lack
of grounding. It is also reflected in the way in which the idea of state
consent opens up the possibility of a legal universe comprised of parallel,
equal-standing, legal regimes that are not subject to any superstructure of
higher-level law.148 This is not mere theoretical conjecture: presidents of

145. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870–1960 364 (Cambridge University Press 2002).
146. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY) 56–57 (The Law Book Exchange 2002) (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT 1927]. See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 416–20 (Oxford Clarendon
Press 1933) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT 1933].
147. For the dual hierarchy approach, see Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary
International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665 (1953). For a critique, see Kammerhofer,
supra note 4, at 539–40.
148. See Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 549.

36

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:1

the ICJ have warned on several occasions of the risks posed by fragmentation and over-lapping jurisdictions, and one of them noted that “the
proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity of international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations.”149
The search for alternative sources of validity is not new. A prominent
example is the appeal to morality as an independent source of international law. This modern phenomenon represents, so it seems, a return to
the tradition of natural law that dates back to Hugo Grotius (1583–1645).
The natural law tradition received renewed attention in the early 20th century, appearing in the academic writings of several legal scholars in a
counter-reaction to the rise of legal positivism. Thus, in 1927 Hersch
Lauterpacht, in Private Law Sources and Analogies of International
Law: with Special Reference to International Arbitration, wrote about a
renaissance of natural law.150 He refers to several modern reconstructions
of this tradition, invoking concepts such as “the sense of right” and “social solidarity.” Particularly illuminating is a quote from Frederick Pollock: “We must either admit that modern international law is a law
founded on cosmopolitan principles of reason, a true living offshoot of
the Law of Nature, or ignore our most authoritative expositions of it.”151
Lauterpacht further developed this thesis in his article, The Grotian Tradition in International Law.152 For Lauterpacht, the force of the Grotian
tradition stemmed from the intrinsic insufficiency of the “conception of
international law as derived from state will” and from the “constant need
. . . [to] judg[e] its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason.”153 It

149. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, ICJ, Address to the U.N.G.A. (Oct. 30,
2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=82&p1=6&p2=1&
search=%22%2230+October+2001%22%22. See also Guillaume Speech 2000, supra
note 1; Schwebel Speech 1999, supra note 1. On the issue of fragmentation, see Martti
Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553–56 (2002).
150. LAUGHTERPACHT 1927, supra note 146, at 58.
151. Id. at 58–59, n.7 (quoting Frederick Pollack).
152. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1, 21–24 (1946). Another important figure in the revival of the Grotian tradition
was Cornelius van Vollenhoven, especially in his Three Stages in the Evolution of International Law (1919). See Renee Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and
the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL.
223, 224 (2006).
153. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 408. Lauterpacht argues that “the acceptance of
the law of nature as an independent source of international law” is one of the precepts of
modern international law. Lauterpacht, supra note 152, at 51. For further information, see
C. Wilfred Jenks, Hersch Lauterpacht: the Scholar as Prophet, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
72 (1960); Jeffery, supra note 152, at 237–41.
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seems, then, that international law has never been pure. Nor is the search
for alternative groundings a new phenomenon.
B. The Problem of Grounding in Law and the Truth-Teller Paradox
The problem of grounding is a measure of the deep indeterminacy that
is part and parcel of the concept of law in both its municipal and international realizations. The question of grounding does not afflict only the
Westphalian scheme of consent⎯it is common to all the forms of validity considered above. Whenever a new source of validity is invoked as an
alternative to the Westphalian paradigm, the question of its own justification remains in a mist of arbitrary articulations. In considering this problematic, it is interesting to consider a similar puzzle that arises in the
field of semantics—the Truth-Teller Paradox. Consider the following
sentence:
K1 This sentence is true.

We can use the structure of this sentence to produce a truth-telling sequence (with each sentence belonging to the domain of its predecessor):
The next sentence is true.
The next sentence is true.
The next sentence is true.
. . . (ad infinitum).154

Initially, one may take these truth-telling sentences as unproblematic.
Indeed, these sentences do not generate the kind of semantic instability
that characterizes liar-like sentences. However, upon reflection, this conclusion seems hasty. In this case (as with the liar-like statements), the
sentences involved can consistently be assigned conflicting true/false
values. This makes them hopelessly undetermined.155 The distinction
between the Liar Paradox and the Truth-Teller Paradox is that in the
former, “the problem is that there is no consistent assignment of truthvalues,” while in the latter, “the problem is that there are too many consistent assignments;” thus, any “assignment must involve an arbitrary
choice as to which truth-value should be assigned.” 156
154. This example is taken from Hans G. Herzberger, Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics, 67 J. PHIL. 145, 150 (1970). See also Roy Sorensen, Future Law: Prepunishment
and the Causal Theory of Verdicts, 40 NOUS 166, 176 (2006).
155. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge, Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair, 84 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL, 395, 397–399 (2006).
156. ROY SORENSEN, VAGUENESS AND CONTRADICTION 167 (Oxford University Press
2002). See also Herzberger, supra note 21, at 150.
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The notion of validity in law produces something akin to the TruthTeller Paradox. Validity is the qualifying mark or label of legal norms.157
It distinguishes between the law (rules) in force and that which is not
law. In other words: “Law which is not valid is not law.”158 Thus, determining the validity of norms is of critical importance; it is essential to the
formation of normative expectations and is also a critical component of
legal decision-making. It is the validity of the law that makes its normative statements binding. While non-legal prescriptive statements also
purport to be binding, they invoke other reasons for their bindingness.159
But validity is not only a mark unique to law; it can only be endowed and
transferred according to law. The concept of validity thus holds an inevitable circularity: validity can only be determined recursively, that is, by
reference to valid law.160 Because norms cannot be evaluated through the
logical prism of truth and falsity, the concept of validity operates as a
plausible alternative.161 Consider, for example, the following set of rules
(“the Paradox of Validity”):
Rule 1.1:

This rule, and all the rules enumerated below, are valid.

Rule 2.1:

...

Rule 2.2:

...

Rule 2.3:

...

...
157. Varga, supra note 141, at 155.
158. LUHMANN, supra note 27, at 125.
159. See Vranas, supra note 35, § 3 (discussing the notion of bindingness).
160. LUHMANN, supra note 27, at 128; Varga, supra note 141, at 155–56.
161. Vladimir Svoboda, Forms of Norms and Validity, 80 PONZAN STUD. PHIL. SCI.
AND HUMAN. 223, 229 (2003). As in classical logic, I assume bivalence, i.e., a binary
distinction between valid/not-valid. While validity resembles in some aspects the notion
of truth, it does not generate the same kind of paradoxes. Thus, for example, the notion of
validity does not yield a paradox parallel to the Liar Paradox. As an example, imagine
that you open the Civil Code that is in force in your country. On page 100 of the Code,
you find rule number 499, which states:
499. This rule is not valid.
What is the meaning of this sentence? Consider, first, the option that rule 499 is valid—
that is, it represents the law in force. If it is valid, then what it says is valid as well, and
since it says about itself that it is not valid, this must be valid as well. This is a contradiction. Assume, alternatively, that rule 499 is not valid. Then what it says about itself is
indeed the case, and no contradiction arises (strictly speaking, if a rule is not valid, what
it says is legally irrelevant). Unlike the Liar Paradox, there is a simple way out: we assume that rule 499 is not valid. This leaves us with the riddle of how and why this sentence was incorporated into the Code in the first place.

2007]
Rule 2.n:

PURITY LOST

39

. . . (ad infinitum).

This sequence of rules can have two consistent assignments (at least)
of validity values. The first, in which both the Rule 1.1 (“meta rule”) and
all the other rules (“secondary rules”) are valid, and the second, in which
both the meta rule and all the secondary rules are invalid.162 The TruthTeller Paradox generates a similar problem of multiple (consistent) assignments of truth and falsity.
Note, however, that there are important differences between the Paradox of Validity and the Truth-Teller Paradox. In the latter, it is possible
to argue that the sentences included in the Truth-Teller sequence are
vacuous or under specified; this reflects the fact that these sentences do
not supply concrete conditions by which their truth or falsity may be determined. They fail to yield a statement.163 The parallel legal sequence is
not vacuous. Even if we consider it invalid, its deontic content is not lost.
The normative statements simply lose the color of law; they become nonlegal norms.
The foregoing paradox reflects one of the deepest dilemmas of modern
law: on one hand, we feel uncomfortable with the thought that law validates itself; on the other hand, this is exactly what is expected from the
law according to the modern conception of validity⎯that is, that validity
can only be endowed according to law. The assumption that the criteria
and authority for determining the validity of norms must be instituted
through valid law thus generates a vicious circularity, which seems to be
logically irresolvable.
At this point, it might make sense to turn to philosophy. Perhaps we
can gain some inspiration from the various strategies invoked by philosophers to resolve the puzzle of semantical paradoxes. Let me briefly
sketch some of the attempts to resolve these paradoxes.164
Alfred Tarski proposed to resolve the puzzle of the Liar Paradox by replacing our everyday, singular understanding of truth with a multi-level
162. The qualification “at least” is necessary because once we assume that the meta
rule is not valid, there can be multiple assignments of validity that attribute different values to the secondary rules.
163. Transforming K1 into a bi-conditional yields the following vacuous sentence: K1
is true if and only if K1 is true. In contrast, in proper statements such transformation
makes perfect sense. Consider: K2 Leaves are green. The sentence “K2 is true if and only
leaves are green” is fully specified. See Laurence Goldstein, Fibonacci, Yablo, and the
Cassationist Approach to Paradox, 115 MIND 867, 884–85 (2006).
164. See generally, SAINSBURY, supra note 13; RESCHER, supra note 12. An important
solution strategy that I will not discuss is based on rejecting (some) of the assumptions of
classical logic (e.g., the law of excluded middle). See, e.g., Graham Priest, What Is So
Bad About Contradictions, 95 J. PHIL. 410 (1998).
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linguistic framework.165 According to this construction, one is able to
speak meaningfully about the truth of statements in one language (the
object language) only in a language that is located higher on the linguistic hierarchy than the object language and whose expressive capacities
are essentially richer (the meta language).166
Another approach views the non-hierarchical character of natural language as a given. It proposes to resolve the riddle of the Liar and TruthTeller Paradoxes by arguing that groundless sentences are intrinsically
ill-formed and should be excluded from the realm of statements⎯statement being understood as a sentence that is “used to say
something true or false.”167 It is argued that groundless sentences, while
grammatically correct, fail to make any statement; they are, in other
words, truth incompetent. Furthermore, since these sentences are truth
incompetent, it makes no sense to ask whether they are true or false.168
Laurence Goldstein argues that the reason why liar-like sentences generate such awe and confusion is not because of any deep logical problematic, but rather because of certain deep-seated beliefs and preconceptions that characterize human thought. Underlying the semantical paradoxes is our naive intuition that “the paradoxical sentences, because they
are not ungrammatical, vague or sortally suspect and encompass no false
presuppositions, must yield statements when used.”169 The analysis of
these paradoxes thus seems to belong more to the realm of psychology
than to the realm of logic.
In effect, the foregoing approaches introduce, though for different reasons, a general ban on self-reference and other forms of groundlessness.
However, this ban may seem too strict for and incongruent with our intuitions regarding the use of language. An alternative approach is offered
by the model of naive semantics, articulated by Hans Herzberger. The
essence of this approach is the following:
In naive semantics, paradoxes are allowed to arise freely and to work
their own way out. No semantic defences are to be set up against them.
. . . No effort will be made to eliminate the paradoxes, to suppress

165. Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics, 3 PHIL. PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 341, 350–51 (1944).
166. Id. at 349–52.
167. Statement, following Goldstein, is understood as “a truth-bearer, a used sentence—‘used’ not in the sense just of being uttered out loud (a pheme) or written down (a
grapheme) but in the sense of being used to say something true or false.” Laurence Goldstein, A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes, 100 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 53, 54
(1999) (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 58.
169. Id. at 69.
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them, or in any way to interfere and take deliberate action against them.
They are to unfold according to their own inner principles. In its early
stages naive semantics may appear somewhat haphazard and even chaotic. Gradually some islands of stability will emerge and grow until
eventually everything has resettled into a new but orderly arrangement.170

Instead of trying to break or suppress the semantic instability associated with semantical paradoxes⎯their oscillation between truth and falsity⎯naive semantics calls us to embrace it. This can be achieved by
exposing the pattern through which paradoxical statements change their
values at different stages of evaluation.171 Naive semantics thus rejects
any attempt to classify liar-like sentences as neither true nor false or both
true and false. Their “fundamental semantic character is neither a truth
value nor the absence of a truth value, but a valuational pattern” that has
certain regularities.172 By demonstrating that paradoxical sentences follow certain regularities, naive semantics shows “how a language could
contain paradoxical statements and nevertheless have a systematic and
coherent semantic structure.”173
What are the implications of the philosophical struggle with semantical
paradoxes for the study of the paradox of validity? Consider Tarski’s
hierarchical conception of truth.174 To apply Tarski’s proposal to law,
one would have to assume a hierarchy of laws in which the validity of
the lower-level normative layer could only be determined through the
prism of a higher law. This hierarchical conceptualization of validity is
inconsistent, however, with our practical experience of law as a unitary
system. So maybe, following the philosophical strategy of barring
170. Herzberger, supra note 21, at 482.
171. This valuation technique consists of two phases:
Each statement undergoes two phases of evaluation, either of which can be
trivially simple or, within fixed bounds, extremely complicated. Each statement
can be assigned two characteristic ordinal numbers: a stabilization point and a
fundamental periodicity. The stabilization point for a statement marks the earliest stage at which its valuations become periodic, and its periodicity marks the
length of its valuational cycle.
Id. at 492 (emphasis in original). Thus, for example, the Looped Liar discussed above,
supra note 19 and accompanying text, is cyclic with periodicity 4. Starting with the assumption that Plato’s statement is true leads to the conclusion that Socrates’ statement is
true, so that Plato’s statement is in fact false. Thus, Socrates’ statement is false, coming
full circle to the original conclusion that Plato’s statement is true. If we attribute the values (1, 0) to (true, false) we get the following cyclical pattern: 11001100 . . . .
172. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Tarski, supra note 165, at 349–52.
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groundless sentences, we should impose a ban on groundless normative
structures? This solution raises many difficulties: first, because the idea
that validity should only be endowed according to law has deep roots in
the moral and political culture of the Western world, and second, because
it is not clear what constitutes a proper grounding for a global norm.
The answer to the question of legal paradoxicality lies elsewhere, and
requires, as will be argued below, a conceptual switch. This alternative
approach has some resonance with the dynamic vision of naive semantics.
C. The Praxis of Paradox: From Purity to System Dynamics
Exploring the puzzle of legal paradoxes requires a departure from the
philosophical and logical approach to the study of paradoxes. The philosophical inquiry has been guided by the idea that paradoxes represent a
certain malady of thought that should somehow be eliminated, prevented,
or resolved.175 One of the main tasks of logic is to free us from this disease.176
The philosophical approach is not applicable to law because the notion
of paradox⎯in its philosophical and logical connotations⎯does not apply to law in its social instantiation.177 This has to do with the fact that
paradoxes are properties of sentences.178 Because law, as a social system,
is not reducible to sentences (e.g., norms), it cannot be, strictly speaking,
paradoxical⎯although it can be depicted as self-referential, self-

175. Thus, Alfred Tarski has noted in one of his papers: “The appearance of an antinomy is for me a symptom of disease.” Alfred Tarski, Truth and Proof, 220 SCI. AM. 63,
66 (1969).
176. Nicholas Rescher observes: “The prime directive of rationality is to restore consistency in such situations.” RESCHER, supra note 12, at 9. See also Chihara, supra note
13, at 590–91.
177. The gap between the logical and legal planes has remained unnoticed by some
legal scholars. For example George Fletcher, in his article Paradoxes in Legal Thought,
notes: “This Article commits itself to logical consistency as the indispensable foundation
for effective dialogue and coherent criticism. Only if we accept consistency as an overriding legal value will we be troubled by the paradoxes and antinomies that lie latent in our
undeveloped systems of legal thought. Grappling with uncovered paradoxes and antinomies will impel us toward consistent theoretical structures.” George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (1985).
178. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 54. I use the term “sentence” to denote a string of
words satisfying the grammatical rules of a language. See WordNet 2.0 dictionary,
http://wordnet.princeton.edu (follow “search” hyperlink and search for “sentence”). This
broad definition includes sentences in the form of both statements and norms. Statements
(or claims), unlike norms, are truth-bearers; they can be true or false.
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organizing, or self-producing.179 The paradoxes of law emerge as sentential reflections of its unique systemic structure⎯of its self-organizing
and self-producing features. A self-organizing system is a system that not
only regulates or adapts its behaviour, but creates its own organization.
Self-production (or autopoiesis) denotes the process by which a system
recursively produces its own network of components (in the case of law,
communication ordered by the distinction legal/illegal), thus continuously regenerating its essential organization in the face of external perturbations and internal erosion.180 Self-organizing and self-producing
systems are intrinsically circular and self-referential.181
Recognizing that the paradoxes of law are reflections of its unique systemic structure indicates that the notion of purity does not provide a suitable guide for the study of legal paradoxicality.182 One cannot purify the
179. One of the key lessons of the social analysis of law is the understanding that the
essence of law cannot be captured by simply enumerating its normative content. This
point has been forcefully made by Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann. Describing the
law as a system of rules or a system of symbols, Teubner argues, provides no answer to
the dynamic property of law, to its self-regulatory capacity: “For how are norms to produce norms or symbols to generate symbols? We can only conceive of the law producing
itself if we understand it no longer as a mere system of rules but as a system of actions.”
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 18 (Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne
Bankowska & Ruther Adler trans., Blackwell Publishers 1993). See also NIKLAS
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 98–105, 177 (Fatima Katner et al. eds., Klaus A.
Ziegert trans., Oxford University Press 2004); Neil MacCormick, Norms, Institutions,
and institutional Facts, 17 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (SPECIAL ISSUE) 301, 330–31 (1998).
180. Francis Heylighen, 2001, The Science of Self-organization and Adaptivity, in
Technology, Information, and Systems Management Resources, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (EOLSS), Developed Under the Auspices of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], EOLSS Publishers, Oxford,
UK, http://www.eolss.net; Francis Heylighen & Cliff Joslyn, Cybernetics and Second
Order Cybernetics, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 155, 155–
170 (Robert A. Meyers ed., 2002) [hereinafter Heylighen & Joslyn]. On the definition of
self-organization, see id. at 160–61.
181. In mathematical terms, these forms of circularity can be modeled by an equation
representing how some phenomenon or variable y is mapped onto itself by a transformation or process f: y = f(y). To make sense of this equation, one needs to explicate what y
and f stand for. For a more detailed analysis, see Heylighen & Joslyn, supra note 180, at
160.
182. The notion of purification is invoked, for example, by Nicholas Rescher.
RESCHER, supra note 12, at 31. Rescher himself provides some support for the foregoing
thesis in his distinction between the practical and theoretical contexts. In practical contexts, Rescher argues, “there is a possibility of compromise—of affecting a division that
enables us in some way and to some extent ‘to have it both ways,’ say, to proceed A-wise
on even days and B-wise on odd ones. But we cannot rationally do this with beliefs. In
theoretical contexts we must choose—must resolve the issue one way or another.” Id. at
11.
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law from its paradoxes because they reflect vital steering and stabilizing
mechanisms without which the law would not be able to counteract external pressures.183 The static perspective, which characterises the study
of paradoxes in logic, is not suited for that task because it is not sensitive
to the social dynamic underlying the paradoxes of law.184 The circular
quality of the concept of validity is therefore an inevitable feature of legal communication. This circularity does not undermine the normative
unity of the legal system because the mark of validity is taken for granted
in the recursive operations of the law.185 Further, in functional terms, this
circularity provides the law with far-reaching flexibility by empowering
it to create and destruct normative structures in response to conflicting
social pressures.
V. THE POLYMORPHOSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
REPERCUSSIONS
The groundlessness of law is not, then, a new problem. Still, I will argue that the paradoxicality of the contemporary system of international
law constitutes a novel phenomenon. What is unique in the structure of
the international legal system is not the impurity of our forms of validation, but the emergence of multiple validating techniques, which are invoked simultaneously at the forefront of the international legal body. The
global legal system has moved from a state of (imaginary) purity to a
state of multiple paradoxicalities⎯a process of polymorphosis⎯leading
to a much more complex juridical universe.186 But what are the social
implications of this process? In order to answer this question, let me first

183. It is simply wrong, therefore, to view consistency, as Fletcher does, “as an overriding legal value” (although the appearance of consistency—concealing the paradox—
could have instrumental value). See Fletcher, supra note 177, at 1265.
184. A notable exception is naive semantics, which, as we saw earlier, emphasizes the
dynamic aspect of semantical paradoxes. See generally PATRICK GRIM ET AL., THE
PHILOSOPHICAL COMPUTER: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL COMPUTER
MODELING 13–57 (MIT Press 1998). However, these attempts, which are based on the
idea of iterated functional sequences, do not capture the innovative feature of the law—its
capacity to produce surprises.
185. This is why law cannot include a right to revolution. This idea was nicely captured by an old English verse dealing with the paradox of treason (quoted by Josef Kunz):
“Treason cannot prosper, what’s the reason? For if it does, who would dare to call it treason?” Josef L. Kunz, Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law, 41 AM. J.
INT’L L. 119, 121 n.6 (1947).
186. See also Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Collisions: The
Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
999, 1000–01 (2004).
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outline the key types of deep inconsistencies that afflict the contemporary universe of international law.
1)

Horizontal inconsistent sources of validation.
There is no universally agreed upon concept of
validity. Different international regimes use different notions of validity (compare the WTO regime to the ICA).187 In some cases, this form of
inconsistency leads to transregime conflicts
(e.g., the clash between treaty and contractual
obligations in the investment domain and the
clash between consent and technology in Internet law).188

2)

Internal inconsistency. Within the same legal regime, it is possible to find conflicting conceptions of validity pulling in different directions
(e.g., the cases of the WTO and the ICC).189

3)

The incorporation of vague sources of validity
(from morality to science). Vagueness yields
conflicting interpretations both within particular
regimes and across regimes (e.g., the new principle of civilian inviolability and the precautionary principle).190

Together, these inconsistencies bring forth a legal universe whose
complexity is multidimensional. The complexity of modern international
law cannot be captured through reference to the heterogeneous, institutional reality of multiple legal tribunals. Its complexity runs deeper, covering many layers of legal praxis and challenging the traditional boundaries and tenets of international law (such as the distinction between public and private international law). But what are the possible repercussions
of the polymorphosis process? In the following Sections, I explore this
question by considering the influence of the polymorphosis process on
the structure and autonomy of the global legal system, on its stability, its
relationship with other systems of governance, and on its external legitimacy. Responding to these questions requires us to move from the realm
of historic-analytic analysis into the realm of futuristic socio-legal analysis. This move also makes the following discussion much more explorative (even speculative).
187.
188.
189.
190.

Compare supra Section II.B.1, with supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section III.B.
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A. From Colonization to Internal Complexification: The Emergence of
Cosmopolitan Law
The polymorphosis process can be postulated to be a consequence of
the colonization or instrumentalization of the global legal system by multifarious external systems.191 There are certainly voices that argue that
this colonization is widespread, with a finger pointed, in particular, to the
global economic system or the so-called “Washington Consensus.”192
Economic rationality and economic institutions (in all their different embodiments, public and private), it is argued, are actually calling the shots;
the law⎯from the WTO to the Climate Change Convention⎯operates as
a mere façade for economic calculations and corporate interests.193 While
this argument has some merit, I do not find it convincing as an explanation for the diverse processes depicted above.
There are two main reasons for my skepticism. First, the diversity and
complexity of the different validation techniques⎯reflecting both their
horizontal incompatibilities and their internal fuzziness⎯makes this argument unconvincing. The empirical argument that served to reject
Kunz’s purity thesis by questioning its coherence likewise serves to reject this totalistic Marxist critique (by similarly questioning its coherence). Second, the search for grounding, which underlies all of the forms
of validation discussed in Section III, reflects a common adherence to the

191. On the risk of the colonization of global law by external sources see, for example,
Fischer-Lescano, supra note 99.
192. See William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus, HARPER’S, May 2003.
193. See, e.g., David Held, Globalisation: the Dangers and the Answers, OPEN
DEMOCRACY, May 27, 2004, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationvision_reflections/article_1918.jsp; Finnegan, supra note 192, at 41; Noam Chomsky,
The Passion for Free Markets Exporting American Values Through the New World Trade
Organization, Z MAGAZINE, May 1997, available at http://www.zmag.org/
zmag/articles/may97chomsky.html. Noam Chomsky provides a prototypical formulation
of the colonization argument. Referring to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, he argues that “the ‘new tool’ allows the U.S. to intervene profoundly in the internal affairs of others, compelling them to change their laws and practices. Crucially, the
WTO will make sure that other countries are ‘following through on their commitments to
allow foreigners to invest’ without restriction in central areas of their economy. In the
specific case at hand, the likely outcome is clear to all: ‘The obvious corporate beneficiaries of this new era will be U.S. carriers, who are best positioned to dominate a level
playing field . . . .’” Id. In a similar fashion, the bundling of law and technology can be
viewed as an “automatic” mechanism that is controlled by private firms—and serves their
interests. Margaret Radin has recently argued that this new form of machine-implemented
self-enforcement reflects the replacement of the law of the legislature by the law of the
firm. Radin, supra note 127, at 1233.
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concept of normativity. Indeed, the quest for validity can only make
sense within the realm of law.194
The polymorphosis process represents, therefore, something else: an
internally generated process of complexification. It is a purely internal
phenomenon⎯an internally driven reconstruction of law’s groundings
with the law reacting, but not yielding, to external sources.195 The appeal
to democracy, science, morality, direct consent, and technology does not
signal the colonization of law, but rather an extension of the horizon of
possibilities through which international law, in its various realizations,
can react to external pressures. But the polymorphosis process represents
a deeper message. It brings forth a new kind of global law⎯a truly cosmopolitan phenomenon. The unity of this new body of global laws does
not derive from the ideal of national sovereignty or from some projected
global hierarchy;196 rather, it is constituted through a common appeal to
the concepts of normativity and grounding, which are postulated as universally applicable distinctions.
B. Paradox, Diversity, and Resilience
The polymorphosis process does not seem to reflect, then, the subjugation of the law by external forces. However, the impact of this process on
the functional operation of the law and on its relationship with other social systems still constitutes an unresolved problematic. This problematic
raises two questions: first, could the multiple forms of self-reference and
inconsistencies associated with the polymorphosis process lead to irresolvable conflicts within and between regimes, leading ultimately to
the total paralysis of the global legal system?197 Second, and in light of
this possibility, could the entanglement of the law in its internal paradoxes lead to the expansion of other social systems (economics, politics,
morality, and religion), simultaneously causing global law to contract as
problems migrate to other systems?
194. See Varga, supra note 141, at 164.
195. This does not mean that the question of the grounding of law is not discussed in
non-legal domains, such as politics or philosophy; however, from an internal perspective,
this external deliberation appears as noise.
196. Hence, one can no longer argue that “national sovereignty is the condition of
global law and global law is the condition of sovereignty being possible.” FischerLescano, supra note 99, at 347. Nor can such unity be found in the International Court of
Justice as the apex of some postulated hierarchy. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note
149, at 577.
197. For this possibility, see Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 186, at 1004;
GREG C. SHAFFER & MARK A. POLLACK, REGULATING RISK IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE
UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 1–47 (Oxford University
Press forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with author).
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Systems theory recognizes operational paralysis and structural disintegration as a possible trajectory in the life of ecological and social systems.198 However, this conjecture is not the most plausible account of the
future direction of the contemporary global legal system. I argue that the
complexity and diversity of the contemporary body of law, with its proliferation of validation techniques, should be seen, at this point, as a
source of strength rather than weakness. This complexity contributes to
the resilience of the global legal system and enhances its ability to respond to external pressures. The legal anxiety associated with the possibility of regime collisions and normative contradictions199 confuses the
micro level (the ramifications of a local dispute, e.g., between the WTO
regime and the Kyoto Protocol) and the macro level—the resilience of
the global legal system in its totality.
This argument draws on the study of the relation between system resilience and diversity in ecology. The concept of resilience is used in ecology to denote the width or limit of a stability domain in an ecological
system and is defined by the “magnitude of disturbance that a system can
absorb before it changes stable states.”200 Biodiversity is defined as a
measure of two features of an ecological system: functional-group diversity and functional-response diversity.201 Functional-group diversity
measures the diversity of the ecosystem in terms of groups of species that
fulfill different functions (e.g., species may pollinate, graze, predate, fix
nitrogen, etc.).202 The persistence of functional groups contributes to the
performance of ecosystems and the services that they generate, while the
loss of a major functional group, such as apex predators, may cause drastic alterations in ecosystem functioning.203 Functional-response diversity

198. See, e.g., Carl Folke et al., Regime Shifts, Resilience and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management, 35 ANNUAL REV. ECOL. EVOL. SYST. 557, 558 (2004); Ahmet E.
Kideys, Fall and Rise of the Black Sea Ecosystem, 297 SCIENCE 1482 (2002); Brian
Walker & Jacqueline A. Meyers, Thresholds in Ecological and Social-Ecological Systems: A Developing Database, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 3, 12 (2004).
199. See, e.g., Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 186, at 1002; Rosalyn Higgins,
A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, Keynote Speech Given by
President Rosalyn Higgins at the Spring Meeting of the International Law Association on
4 March 2006, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 791, 792 (2006).
200. Lance Gunderson, Ecological Resilience—In Theory and Application, 31 ANN.
REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 425, 427 (2000). Likewise, Folke et al. define resilience
as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing
change so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”
Folke et al., supra note 198, at 558.
201. Folke et al., supra note 198, at 569.
202. Id. at 570.
203. Id.
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is defined in terms of the diversity of responses to environmental change
among species that contribute to the same ecosystem function.204 Variability in response to environmental change within the same functional
group is critical to ecosystem resilience.205
There is an increasing consensus among ecologists that biodiversity
contributes to system resilience by increasing sources of renewal and
reorganization, and by providing a rich response horizon.206 Generally,
biodiversity provides cross-scale resilience. Species combine to form an
overlapping set of reinforcing influences, spreading risks and benefits
widely, and thus retaining overall consistency in performance, independent of wide fluctuations in the individual species.207
Using biological concepts in the study of social processes is not a trivial exercise. The following comments constitute a first step in an exploration of the applicability of the idea of ecosystem resilience to the study of
social systems.208 In the context of law, resilience may be understood in
terms of the capacity of the legal system to withstand external colonization attempts (reflecting a shift from autonomy to allonomy)209 or its capacity to maintain a certain level of communicative activity (with different levels representing different states). The diversity of validation techniques constitutes a form of functional-response diversity. It provides the
law with multiple avenues to respond to external pressures, maintaining,
nonetheless, its normative unity (against competing social orders).210
This diversity—which in the legal domain is translated into paradoxical tensions at the meta-normative level—has advantages at both the micro-regime level and the macro-meta-system level. Let me give a few
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 572.
207. Gunderson, supra note 200, at 431. The distribution of functional diversity within
and across scales allows regeneration and renewal to occur following ecological disruption over a wide range of scales (with scale defined as a range of spatial and temporal
frequencies). Garry Peterson, Craig R. Allen & C.S. Holling, Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and Scale, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 6, 11, 16 (1998).
208. For other attempts to use biological ideas in the study of social systems, see
NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 12–58 (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker trans.,
Stanford Univeristy Press 1995); Heylighen, supra note 180, at 24 (the concept of selforganization).
209. “Allonomy,” literally meaning external law, refers to the situation in which a
system is regulated or controlled from the outside. FRANCISCO J. VARELA, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOLOGICAL AUTONOMY xi (George Klir ed., Elsevier North Holland, Inc. 1979).
210. Diversity contributes therefore to the continuance of (transnational) legal communication. See Heylighen & Joslyn, supra note 180, at 162–63. To the extent that law is
taken as a better way to resolve societal conflicts (e.g., relative to force), this result has
important moral value.
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concrete examples. In the case of the WTO, the friction between the
autonomy of the legal system and its apparent commitment to the Westphalian paradigm allows the law to proceed with its internally driven
conceptual innovation while still relying on the legitimacy produced by
the ideal of state consent.211 The reference to external validating
sources⎯such as science and environmental ethics⎯further enriches the
response horizon of WTO law. In the case of the lex mercatoria, the tension between disaggregated contractual sources and a permanent institutional and doctrinal apparatus allows the law to develop deep sensitivities
to the needs of the global economic system within a stable institutional
infrastructure, providing the system with memory and coherence (despite
its fragmented foundations). The reliance on (and development of) universal private law doctrines that operate as a common conceptual grid
constitutes an additional source of validity and stability. At the metaregime level, the interplay between the different validation sources allows the legal system to respond to multiple social needs despite political
and economic constraints. Thus, for example, the GRI, drawing upon an
innovative institutional structure based on a tripartite commitment to
consensus-building, inclusive decision-making process, and the vision of
sustainable development, has successfully initiated a new global scheme
dealing with corporate sustainable reporting in a field in which the conventional treaty-making route would have faced formidable obstacles.212
The lesson from the biological discussion of diversity and resilience
seems to be clear: there is value in diversity in both its institutional and
normative dimensions. In terms of institutional design, this suggests, I
will argue, a shift from models of institutional hierarchy and normative
unity to reflexive models that maintain this diversity and the paradoxical
frictions associated with it.213 I will say more about that in Section VI.
C. The Implications for the Legitimacy of the Global Legal System
Finally, a key question is to what extent the paradoxes of validity influence the (external) legitimacy of international law. This question requires us to distinguish between moral and sociological understandings
of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in the moral, normative sense, refers to the
right to rule.214 Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane argue that in the

211. Picciotto, supra note 61, at 496. See also supra Section II.B.1.
212. See GRI G3, supra note 104.
213. For a similar conclusion, see Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 186, at
1004.
214. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 603 (1999) (arguing
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case of global institutions, the right to rule should be understood to mean
“both that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules and
attempting to secure compliance with them and that people subject to
those rules have moral, content-independent reasons to follow them
and/or to not interfere with others’ compliance with them.”215 Legitimacy, in a sociological sense, is a measure of belief. From a sociological
perspective, an institution is legitimate when it is widely believed to have
the right to rule.216 Legitimacy is therefore a subjective quality, defined
by the perception of the institution in the eyes of the individual.217
There is a sharp distinction between sociological and normative perspectives. From a sociological perspective, making a claim about the legitimacy of certain global institutions should not be seen as a “moral
claim about the universal legitimacy, or even less the moral worth, of any
particular international rule.”218 This understanding of the sociological
aspect of legitimacy provides, however, only part of the picture because
it focuses exclusively on the individual perspective.219 One can also take
a systemic-institutional view of legitimacy. This perspective conceptualizes legitimacy as a measure of the capacity of the law to maintain its
autonomy and as a measure of the growth or contraction of legal communication.
In exploring the relation between legitimacy and validity, I want to focus on one concrete question: what are the implications of the autological
and increasingly heterogeneous character of the concept of validity for
the legitimacy of global law? I will start with the moral aspect of legitimacy and will then consider the sociological aspect. Initially, one can
take the view that the validity of the law is irrelevant to the question of
legitimacy. Legitimacy is a moral measure, which is determined by
moral considerations; as such, it should not be influenced by internal legal constructions. However, as Buchanan and Keohane demonstrate, the
moral legitimacy of international legal institutions is also a function of
the operational dynamic of the legal system.220 To the extent that the

that legitimacy “concerns the justification of authority; it provides grounds for deferring
to another’s decision, even in the absence of coercion or rational persuasion”).
215. Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 411 (2006) (emphasis added). For a definition
of legitimacy, see id. at 405.
216. Id. at 405.
217. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379,
411 (1999).
218. Id. at 381.
219. Id.
220. See generally Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 215.
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various paradoxes of validity influence this dynamic, they can also influence the legitimacy of the law.
Buchanan and Keohane make a two-fold argument in this context.
They argue first that legitimacy is primarily an instrumental measure.
The basic reason for states or other addressees of institutional rules to
take them as binding and for individuals generally to support or at least
to not interfere with the operation of these institutions is that they provide benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. If an institution cannot
effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence, then
this insufficiency undermines its claim to the right to rule.221

Second, Buchanan and Keohane suggest that part of the legitimacy of
global governance institutions lies in certain epistemic-deliberative qualities. In particular, they argue that to be legitimate, a global governance
institution must create the conditions for ongoing critical contestation of
its goals and terms of accountability through interaction with agents and
organizations outside the institution.222 Achieving such epistemic responsiveness requires that the institution be both transparent and open to dialogue with external epistemic actors.223
The question, then, is in what way does the autological and increasingly heterogeneous quality of the concept of validity influence these two
measures of legitimacy? If one adopts the view that the unfolding incoherence of the international legal system could lead to operational paralysis, one could conclude this will ultimately reduce the legitimacy of
the international legal system. If, on the other hand, one adopts the view
that this heterogeneity contributes to the resilience of the global legal
system and to its capacity to cope with the range of problems facing the
global society (as I have argued above), then it is reasonable to assume
that this heterogeneity should contribute to the legitimacy of the international legal body.
The paradoxes of validity could also enhance the legitimacy of international institutions by contributing to their epistemic responsiveness. The
autological character of the transnational legal system turns it into a
highly innovative system. It is, in the words of Heinz von Foerster, a
non-trivial machine.224 Non-trivial machines⎯unlike trivial machines
such as cars and mobile phones⎯are highly disobedient and unpredict221. Id. at 422.
222. Id. at 405–06, 432.
223. Id. at 432.
224. Heinz von Foerster, Principles of Self-Organization—In a Socio-Managerial Context, in SELF-ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 2, 10 (Hans Ulrich
& Gilbert J.B. Probst eds., Springer-Verlag 1984).

2007]

PURITY LOST

53

able.225 In non-trivial machines, “a response once observed for a given
stimulus may not be the same for the same stimulus given later.”226 The
autological nature of the law allows it to continuously challenge its traditional doctrines, analogies, and conceptual constructs. The broad ensemble of validating techniques that characterize the global legal system further enrich this self-reflection process. One of the main virtues of this
self-referential dynamic is that it provides some guarantee against domination and exclusion. By creating an opening for a change, it provides
room and hope for critical voices. In a world that cherishes diversity of
life forms, this competency constitutes an important virtue.227 The deep
heterogeneity of the global legal system seems to cohere better with the
cultural diversity of global society.
The sociological connection between legitimacy and validity constitutes a difficult question. From a systemic perspective, I have argued that
the paradoxes of validity may contribute to the resilience of the law and,
in that sense, may also contribute to its legitimacy (understood as a
measure of legal autonomy and the intensity of legal communication).
Decoding the influence of paradoxes of validity on individual perceptions of legitimacy provides a difficult psychological puzzle. First, because of the low visibility of the paradoxes of validity, it is uncertain to
what extent they affect the perception of global law within the wider
public. If people are not aware of the incoherence and autological character of the law, this fact will not affect their normative beliefs. Second,
these features may influence subjective beliefs in different ways. Incoherence, for example may cause a loss of legitimacy by portraying law as
a field in which decisions are made in a chaotic and arbitrary fashion.
The self-referential nature of validity may put in doubt the bindingness
of law⎯its capacity to provide content-independent reasons for action.
Law has developed, however, doctrinal mechanisms that can cope with
these questions (e.g., the use of vague concepts).228
The cognitive reaction to legal paradoxes is still an under-explored
question. So let me conclude this discussion by looking at the findings of

225. Id.
226. Id. See also Posting of Hanno Kaiser to Normativity, Trivial Machines, and Punishment Blog, http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/2 (June 30, 2004).
227. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION” (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press 1992) (1931); Lawrence
Blum, Recognition, Value, and Equality: A Critique of Charles Taylor’s and Nancy Fraser’s Accounts of Multiculturalism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 51 (1998).
228. Oren Perez, The Institutionalisation of Inconsistency: From Fluid Concepts to
Random Walk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 119, 123 (Oren Perez &
Gunther Teubner eds., Hart Publishing 2006).
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a recent article, which explored the cognitive repercussions of the similar
Truth-Teller Paradox. Shira Elqayam explored the way reasoners evaluate Truth-Teller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) and Liar-type
propositions (‘‘I am lying’’).229 She found, through two experiments, the
existence of a “collapse illusion” by which reasoners evaluate TruthTeller-type propositions as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type
propositions tended to be evaluated as neither true nor false.230 This psychological result is inconsistent with the philosophical view of TruthTeller-type propositions, which considers them hopelessly indeterminate.231 Elqayam offers several psychological explanations for this phenomenon, which I cannot consider in detail here.232 However, it would be
interesting to explore whether a similar phenomenon exists also in the
case of validity.
VI. FROM GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM TO CONTEXTUAL REFLEXIVITY
Modern international law is impure, messy, and complex. But the attempts to purify it through appeals to grand theories⎯constitutional,
moral, or other⎯are ill-conceived.233 First, they fail to recognize the innate paradoxicality of law, and second, they constitute a threat to the legitimacy and resilience of the global legal system. The study of diversity
and resilience in the ecological domain demonstrates the systemic value
of diversity. In terms of institutional design, it suggests a shift from unifying models based on hierarchical normative and institutional structures
to reflexive models that could enhance and support the diversity of the
global legal system. Indeed, as the concepts of normativity and rule of
law become entrenched in the communicative fabric of global society,
there is more room for experimenting with novel and reflexive institutional structures.
I would like to conclude this Article with two examples of highly reflexive legal structures. Underlying both examples is the idea of distributed authority. Such refined authority configurations provide richer opportunities for internal dialogue, self-contestation, and conceptual innovation. The price, though, is some loss of coherence. The two examples
demonstrate how the use of a reflexive structure can affect both the mi229. Shira Elqayam, The Collapse Illusion Effect: A Semantic-Pragmatic Illusion of
Truth and Paradox, 12 THINKING & REASONING 144, 144 (2006).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 145, 170.
232. Id. at 150.
233. Echoes of this purifying mode can be found, for example, in the “constitutional
moment” hypothesis of Slaughter and Burke-White, supra note 99. See also Held, supra
note 85; Kunz, supra note 147.
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cro-dynamic of a single regime, and the interplay between several regimes. These examples also differ in their model of distributed authority
and in the construction of their reflexive dynamic.
My first example focuses on the GRI. The GRI was founded in 1997
by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme.234 The GRI is
based on three potentially conflicting pillars: first, a commitment to
multi-stakeholder decision making; second, an ideological commitment
to the ethos of sustainable development; and third, a formal, hierarchical
institutional structure.235 The commitment to consensual decision-making
is reflected, for example, in the text of the G3 Sustainability Guidelines
(2006):
Transparency about the sustainability of organizational activities is of
interest to a diverse range of stakeholders, including business, labor,
non-governmental organizations, investors, accountancy, and others.
This is why GRI has relied on the collaboration of a large network of
experts from all of these stakeholder groups in consensus-seeking consultations. These consultations, together with practical experience, have
continuously improved the Reporting Framework since GRI’s founding
in 1997. This multi-stakeholder approach to learning has given the Reporting Framework the widespread credibility it enjoys with a range of
stakeholder groups.236

The commitment to the value of sustainable development is set out in
the G3 Guidelines. The Guidelines open with the famous definition of
sustainability provided in the World Commission on Environment and
Development report, Our Common Future.237 In addition to its commitments to multi-stakeholder consultation and sustainable development, the
GRI is also based on a carefully designed hierarchical structure. The GRI
is run by a Board of Directors and a Secretariat.238 The Board has “the
234. GRI, Who We Are, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/ (last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
235. Id.
236. It also finds resonance in the description of the GRI on its Web site: “The ‘Global
Reporting Initiative’ is a large multi-stakeholder network of thousands of experts, in dozens of countries worldwide, who participate in GRI’s working groups and governance
bodies, use the GRI Guidelines to report, access information in GRI-based reports, or
contribute to develop the Reporting Framework in other ways—both formally and informally.” Id.
237. The goal of sustainable development is to “meet the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (Oxford
University Press 1987).
238. GRI, supra note 234.
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ultimate fiduciary, financial, and legal responsibility for the GRI, including final decision making authority on GRI Guidelines revisions, organizational strategy, and work plans.”239 The Secretariat is responsible for
implementing “the technical work plan set by the Board of Directors.”240
While the Stakeholder Council is supposed to provide a kind of parliamentary scrutiny with respect to the Board’s decision-making process, its
formal powers are very limited.241 The Board has the formal capacity to
adopt policies that are inconsistent with the results of the deliberation
process and the ideological commitment to sustainable development.242
The tripartite normative commitment of the GRI could potentially lead
to a range of irresolvable conflicts. Despite this potential for internal
quarrels, the GRI has functioned in an admirable fashion over the last
years. It has produced two Reporting Guidelines over a period of four
years.243 These Guidelines have not only reflected a deep commitment to
ecological values⎯setting ambitious reporting standards that depart from
the conventional, economic-oriented accounting principles⎯but have
also influenced, in a substantive way, the reporting practices of MNEs.244
239. The GRI formal instruments of incorporation are not published on the Web site; I
rely, therefore, on the information that was made public on the GRI Web site. GRI, Board
of Directors, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Board/ (last visited
Oct. 6, 2007).
240. It also supports “the operations of the Board of Directors, Stakeholder Council
and Technical Advisory Committee.” GRI, Secretariat, http://www.globalreport
ing.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Secretariat/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
241. The Stakeholder Council (“SC”) has 60 members. It meets annually and constitutes “the GRI’s formal stakeholder policy forum, similar to a parliament, that debates
and deliberates key strategic and policy issues.” However, its only formal powers are to
approve nominations for the Board of Directors and to provide it with strategic recommendations. The SC members are chosen by the Organizational Stakeholders. GRI,
Stakeholder Council, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/Stakeholder
Council/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007); GRI, Organizational Stakeholders, http://www.global
reporting.org/AboutGRI/WhoWeAre/OrganizationalStakeholders/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2007).
242. See GRI, Board of Directors, supra note 239.
243. Released in 2002 and 2006. GRI, G3 Online, http://www.globalreport
ing.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
244. See KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING
4, 20 (2005). A survey published in 2005 by KPMG analyzed trends in corporate responsibility among the world’s top 250 companies of the Fortune 500 (“G250”) and the top
100 companies in sixteen countries (“N100”). The report found that sustainability reporting has “now become mainstream among G250 companies (sixty-eight percent) and fast
becoming so among N100 companies (forty-eight percent).” Id. at 4. The influence of the
GRI Guidelines was reflected in the fact that forty percent of the reporters mentioned that
the Guidelines were the tool used by the corporation to decide the content of the sustainability report. Id. at 20.
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The GRI reflexive structure seems to have provided the organization
with both innovative capacity and the legitimacy to carry out its mission.
Further, it succeeded in a domain in which progress through the treatymaking route would have been much more difficult.
My second example is based on the vision of judicial dialogue, drawing on the mechanism of preliminary ruling which was developed in the
European Union. This mechanism can be used both in the context of single regimes and in the context of cross-regime relationships. Under Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,245 the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) “may give preliminary rulings interpreting European law at the request of any national court.”246 This
mechanism was initially intended to address only questions relating to
the validity of European law.247 However, “the ECJ successfully encouraged national courts to use the mechanism to review the compatibility of
national law with European law.”248 As a result of the preliminary reference mechanism, there have been fewer occasions on which the ECJ has
exercised its authority to review national judicial decisions. Instead, the
ECJ’s interaction with national courts has become something akin to judicial dialogue, with reciprocal learning and exchange of ideas.249
The European model can serve as a template for creating more extensive dialogue between international tribunals and national courts and
possibly also between different international tribunals. The two regimes
that were discussed in Section II⎯the WTO and the ICC⎯provide only
limited opportunities for such dialogue. In the ICC Treaty, the principle
that the Court is to be complementary to national criminal proceedings
could be seen as a possible platform for this kind of judicial dialogue.
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction
if the state is genuinely willing to carry out the investigation or prosecution of crimes.250 The Statute also outlines processes for judicial review
of national court decisions.251 Formally, the determination as to whether
the domestic court proceedings were independent and impartial lies
solely with the ICC itself; however, such intervention in domestic legal
245. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art.
234, 2001 O.J. (C 80) (EC). Previously, Article 234 was encompassed in Article 177 of
the Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 177,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
246. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2156 (2004).
247. Id. at 2157.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2156–57.
250. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art. 17. See also Maogoto, supra note 70, at 19.
251. Maogoto, supra note 70, at 20.
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proceedings is likely to prove highly controversial, and we can thus expect the Court to be careful in using this authority.252 It seems that incorporating some form of preliminary ruling procedure into the ICC Treaty
could provide more room for judicial dialogue, while at the same time
defusing some of the political tension associated with the judicial review
procedure. Likewise, the WTO does not have procedures to facilitate a
constructive dialogue between national courts and the WTO judicial tribunals (although national courts play an important role in enforcing sections of the WTO rule book, especially in the fields of anti-dumping, intellectual property rights, and government procurement).253 In both cases,
and in particular that of the WTO, designing procedures that facilitate an
equal-footed dialogue between national and international courts could
contribute to the reflexivity and legitimacy of the legal system as a
whole.254
The conceptual shift from purity to reflexivity asks us then to embrace
the paradoxicality of law. The polymorphosis process seems to mark the
end of the dream of grand global constitutionalism.

252. Id. at 21.
253. In the case of anti-dumping, see, for example, James P. Durling, Deference, But
Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 125, 125–
27 (2003).
254. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the details of such procedures. It is
clear, however, that in order to facilitate dialogue, they should not be designed so as to
merely crystallize the supremacy of the international tribunal. In designing such dialogical mechanisms, we should take into account the fact that the WTO rule book, unlike EU
law, is not directly applicable within the jurisdictions of most WTO members.

